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In this thesis, the political philosophy of Robert Nozick as 
espoused in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is examined. Nozick's main con­
clusions are that the minimal state, whose functions are limited to such 
actions as the protection of its citizens against unjustified force, 
theft, fraud and the enforcement of contracts, is justified and no more 
extensive state can be justified. Nozick's defence of this position rests 
on two pillars. The first is the principle of the inviolability of the 
individual, which has its roots in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, and the second is the extensive natural right of property, 
which has its roots in Locke's Second Treatise of Government.
In this thesis, Nozick's use of the principle of the inviolability 
of the individual is accepted and his use of the natural right of property 
is examined. Arguments in support of this natural right are evaluated in 
two categories. In the first category are those arguments in support of 
a natural right of property, which are based on human labour. These are 
discussed in chapter three which concentrates on arguments offered by 
Locke. In the second category are those arguments which attempt to deduce 
a natural right of property from the principle of the inviolability of 
the individual. These are discussed in chapter four.
The conclusions of these examinations are that none of the arguments 
considered is successful in establishing a natural right of property and 
that these two approaches cannot provide successful arguments in support 
of a natural right of property. Furthermore, (most, if not all) other 
approaches to this problem, such as arugments from utility and arguments 
from liberty, are shown to be irrelevant to Nozick's position because they 
cannot establish natural rights. These arguments can at most justify 
property rights as a means to an end, and as such they would not be natu­
ral rights. Therefore, while it may be possible to justify some system
of private property rights, there is no justification for the claim 
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In this thesis I am concerned to evaluate a theory in political 
philosophy. The process of assessing a theory in political philoso­
phy must inevitably involve our moral intuitions. This is not to say 
that our moral intuitions have some special status or that any correct 
theory must fit them exactly. The involvement of our moral intuitions 
is inevitable because any theory in political philosophy will have moral 
consequences. These moral consequences may be intuitively appealing or 
they may be contrary to our considered moral intuitions. We may accept 
the moral consequences and still want to reject the theory which supported 
them. An unfounded or simply incorrect theory can nevertheless generate 
intuitively compelling consequences.
If we decide, however, that the moral consequences generated by a 
particular theory are unacceptable, we cannot simply dismiss the theory.
We must examine the arguments within the theory which support the unaccept­
able consequences. If those arguments prove compelling we must re-examine 
our moral intuitions. Yet even in the face of compelling arguments we may 
decide that our original moral intuitions are correct. When this happens, 
it is necessary either to re-examine the compelling arguments or to delve 
deeper into the theory in order to discover vague, hidden or poorly defen­
ded premises. Such premises should then be evaluated and their role within 
the theory determined.
This procedure for assessing theories in political philosophy is 
similar in many respects to the method of reflective equilibrium outlined 
by John Rawls in A Theory of Justicej- According to Rawls, reflective equi­
librium is the state of affairs reached by reconciling considered moral 
judgements or convictions with a set of moral principles. It is an equi­
librium because the process of reconciling discrepancies between moral 
judgements and a set of moral principles involves using each as a tool to
evaluate the other. Thus, moral judgements will sometimes be altered and 
moral principles will sometimes be altered.
Similarly, in the process of evaluating a theory in political philo­
sophy our intuitions (judgements) about the moral consequences of the 
theory are used to assess the arguments which the theory employs and these 
arguments are used to assess our moral convictions. It is not clear that 
a reflective equilibrium is ever reached with such a theory because the 
theory may have to be discarded or adopted in its entirety. Yet the pro­
cess by which a reflective equilibrium would be reached is the same as the 
process which must be employed to reconcile discrepancies between compelling 
arguments and moral judgements.
These introductory comments are of particular importance because the
subject of this thesis is a theory of the state which is supported by quite
compelling arguments but which has moral consequences that are in conflict
with strongly held moral convictions. The theory was espoused by Robert
2Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia and the controversial nature of his 
conclusions was evident even to him. In the preface, Nozick states that 
"many persons will reject our conclusions instantly, knowing they don't 
want to believe anything so apparently callous towards the needs and suf­
fering of others." (ASU p.ix.). The main conclusions which Nozick reaches 
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia concern the limits of the functions of any 
legitimate state. In Nozick's view, the minimal state, one whose functions 
are limited to such actions as the protection of its citizens against un­
justified force, theft, fraud and the enforcement of contracts, is justified. 
Any more extensive state, any state which goes beyond these narrow limits, 
is unjustified.
In this Chapter, I examine the foundation of Nozick's theory in the 
light of criticisms of its consequences. One of the major pillars of this 
foundation is formed by the natural rights of individuals. In the next
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chapter the concepts of 'a right* and * a natural right* are discussed in 
an effort to determine the particular natural rights on which Nozick*s 
theory is based. The-conclusions of this chapter form the basis for the 
last two chapters of this thesis. Both chapter three and chapter four 
are concerned with arguments that attempt to establish a natural right of 
property. In the third chapter, Locke's arguments from labour are examined. 
In the fourth chapter, arguments based on the principle of the inviolability 
of the individual are evaluated.
Many of the criticisms of Nozick*s position stem from the fact that
the extreme laissez-faire market economy, which is an integral part of
Nozick's theory, creates and perpetuates intolerable inequalities. I do 
not wish here to defend equality as a social goal but is it not unjust 
that some men live in luxury while others exist in conditions of abject 
poverty? Is it not unjust that some men have tremendous opportunities for 
social and economic advancement, while other men have few, if any, oppor­
tunities to improve their situation? Is it not unjust that some men re­
ceive an excellent education while other men are never taught to read or 
write? Is it not unjust that a society which can afford to feed, clothe 
and educate its entire population does not do so?
The state, in Nozick's view, is not to exert any control whatsoever
over the economic actions of individuals. As a result of this, it is ille­
gitimate for the state to attempt to improve the situation of some members 
of society by redistributing wealth or by redirecting resources. Many of 
the institutions which have become commonplace in industrialised countries, 
such as public education and financial assistance for the handicapped and 
destitute, would be absent in a society with a minimal state. It is true 
that voluntary means of redistributing wealth would still be open, but it 
would not, in Nozick's view, be unjust if people went without proper nutri­
tion or medical care.
This situation, a moral consequence of the minimal state, is contrary to 
commonly held and strongly held moral intuitions. People disagree about 
the extent to which government should intervene in the economic realm and 
the extent to which government should aid certain segments of society.
It is rare, however, to encounter an individual who does not find abhorrent 
the thought of a government that did nothing at all to help the needy. 
Nozick states in the preface to Anarchy, State, and Utopia that this moral 
intuition was one which he held prior to considering libertarian views.
The moral judgement that the state should aid those members of society 
who, for one reason or another, are truly in need is not the only moral 
judgment which conflicts with the moral consequences of the minimal state. 
It is also a commonly held moral intuition that the state should act to 
counter actions of individuals that are deemed gross violations of the 
principles of fairness. For example, few would deny that the state should 
intervene to compel an individual to do business with blacks if he would 
otherwise not do so. Yet it is perfectly consistent with Nozick*s views 
to suppose that individuals could choose to do business only with white 
people or only with Christians and that the state would be forbidden to 
intervene. (The only exception to this would be if people withheld all 
of a vital resource. Water, for example, could not be withheld from a 
segment of the population. This would violate the Lockean proviso.)
Another widely held moral intuition which is in conflict with Nozick*s 
conclusions is that the state is at least sometimes justified in passing 
laws which are in the public interest. The laws which compel drug manu­
facturers to comply with certain regulations and testing procedures are 
designed to protect the public. Similarly, with the laws which compel the 
owners of shops and other buildings to meet certain fire standards. There 
is certainly much disagreement concerning the proper extent of government 
regulation but the principle that the government is at least sometimes
justified in regulating the actions of individuals and groups in che pub­
lic interest would only be denied by an affirmed libertarian.
The conclusions about the legitimate functions of the state which 
Nozick reaches are in conflict with several widely held and strongly held 
moral judgements. The judgements are that the state should act in the 
public welfare, out of considerations of fairness and in the public inter­
est. The minimal state is limited to such narrow functions that all three 
of these spheres of actions are closed to it. It is unjust, in Nozick's 
view, for the state to redistribute wealth or to redirect resources in the 
public welfare. It is unjust also for the state to regulate the actions of 
individuals out of consideration for fairness. Finally, it is unjust for 
the state to interfere with or regulate the actions of individuals or 
companies in the public interest.
This conflict between our considered moral judgements and the moral 
consquences of the minimal state provide a powerful but incomplete argu­
ment against Nozick's theory. The argument is incomplete because our moral 
judgements may be wrong and must themselves be judged in the light of the 
arguments which support Nozick's theory. The remainder of this chapter, 
therefore, will be devoted to explicating Nozick's theory.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is divided into three sections. In the 
first section, Nozick is concerned to show that the minimal state can be 
justified. In the second section, Nozick attempts to show that the only 
state which can be justified is the minimal state. Finally, in the third 
section, Nozick assesses the minimal state in the light of utopian theory. 
Although this third section is intended to be a defence of the minimal state 
against the claim that it is singularly uninspiring, it is of little impor­
tance to the present task. In this thesis, I will be concerned with the 
first two sections in which Nozick sets out his defence of the claim that 
the minimal state is the only state which is justified.
The main task which Nozick faces in the first section is to answer the 
individualist anarchist's claim that any state must be immoral. This claim 
rests on the further claim that individuals have natural rights and
that any state in exercising its functions will violate at least some of the 
rights of some individuals. Nozick must respond to this position be­
cause it is based on tenets about individuals and natural rights which 
form and integral part of his own political philosophy. These tenets 
are that individuals have natural rights and that an individual's natural 
rights determine moral constraints upon the actions of other individuals 
or groups. Treating natural rights as constraints on the actions of 
others as opposed to treating them as goals stems from"the underlying 
Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they 
may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without 
their consent." (ASU pp. 30-31). The inviolability of individuals is 
central to Nozick's theory. What Nozick must show, therefore, is how the 
minimal state could arise and function without violating any individual's 
natural rights.
It should be noted that Nozick*s interpretation of the Kantian prin­
ciple that humanity should always be treated as an end and never simply 
as a means differs significantly from how Kant regards this principle.
Kant would agree with Nozick that the treatment of individuals as ends is 
not a goal to be maximised. He would not agree, however, that this entails 
that individuals do not have obligations to aid others. On Nozick's view 
individuals cannot have rights which obligate others unless those who 
are obligated have given their consent. For Kant, such rights arise from 
the categorical imperative?
Nozick begins his derivation of the minimal state with a Lockean in­
terpretation of the state of nature. In such a state of nature, every in­
dividual is free to act within the bounds of the law of nature, which re­
quires that, "no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty
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or possessions." (Bk.II, Sect.6). One of the things which individuals are 
free to do is bind together to enforce the law of nature and thus protect
themselves more effectively and more efficiently than would otherwise 
be possible. In this way, a number of "protective associations" would 
form. In time, one protective association becomes dominant in a given
area. It is important that this occurs as a result of each individual
acting freely. The causes can be put down to self-interest and economies
of scale. This dominant protective association, however, falls short of 
being a state. This is the case for at least two reasons: firstly, the
dominant protective agency does not claim or attempt to operate a monopoly 
on the use of force in a given territory, and secondly, it does not attempt 
to protect all the individuals in its territory, only those who have pur­
chased protection.
Nozick's next move is to claim that those individuals or groups which 
attempt to enforce the law of nature independently of the dominant protect-" 
ive agency pose a threat to those individuals who have purchased protec­
tion because of the inevitable risks involved in independent enforcement.
As a result, the dominant protective agency prohibits the private enforce­
ment of the law of nature. But this is only an 'ultraminimal' state because 
it does not satisfy the second condition mentioned above. Why can the dom­
inant protective agency extend its protection to those who have not purchased 
it?
If the dominant protective agency prohibits the independent enforce­
ment of justice because it is not sufficiently reliable, then it must com­
pensate those independents whose only method of protecting their own rights 
is now unavailable to them. This compensation takes the form of protection 
extended to them by the dominant protective agency. Thus, the two necessary 
conditions for being a state, set out above, are met by the dominant pro­
tective agency in a given territory. The dominant protection agency is a 
state, albeit a minimal state.
The second section of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is divided into 
three chapters. In the first chapter, Nozick develops a theory of
s.
distributive justice which does not require a more than minimal state 
to implement. He then defends this theory against several objections 
and alternative theories. In the second chapter, Nozick deals with ob­
jections to the minimal state, such as those I mentioned earlier.
Lastly, Nozick devotes a chapter to showing how a more than minimal state 
could arise and to showing that it would be an unattractive alternative.
Nozick's theory of distributive justice is the entitlement theory 
according to which a distribution of holdings is a just distribution if it 
arose legitimately. The legitimacy is judged by three principles of distri­
butive justice. The principle of justice in acquisition specifies the 
legitimate way in which holdings can be initially acquired; the principle 
of justice in transfer specifies the ways in which holdings can be trans­
ferred; and the principle of rectification of injustice specifies the ways 
in which infractions of the first two principles can be rectified. The 
unique aspect of the entitlement theory of distributive justice is that a 
distribution is judged on the basis of totally historical principles. No 
distribution can be condemned as being unjust for reasons other then how 
it came about. As a result of this, any distribution which results from 
a just distribution by legitimate means must also be just. (These comments 
ignore the Lockean proviso which will be discussed in Chapter Three).
After developing the entitlement theory, Nozick discusses the use of 
time slice, or end-state principles which concern the structure of the dis­
tribution at a given time. A theory of distributive justice which includes 
end-state principles cannot, according to Nozick, be maintained'without 
interfering in people's lives. Continuously realising a patterned distri­
bution of holdings requires determining for people, at least to some ex­
tent, what they can and cannot do with what is theirs. But according to 
Nozick, this situation is an intolerable infringement on people's liberty 
to act freely and to dispose of their possessions as they see fit.
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As a result of this, taxation, or any redistributive scheme by which some­
thing is taken from one individual (without his consent) in order to be 
given to another, is tantamount to theft. The fact that the recipient may 
desperately need what is being redistributed is simply not relevant.
Rather than present all or most of the points which Nozick makes in 
the remainder of the second section, which would be quite a lengthy task,
I will concentrate on his defence of the minimal state against the intui­
tive objections I raised above. Those objections can be placed under 
three headings: public welfare; fairness; and public interest. The claim 
that the state should provide for the public welfare is certainly rejected 
by Nozick. He not only rejects the claim that some people should be forced, 
to contribute to the welfare of others, he also rejects the whole notion of 
a public welfare.
But there is no social entity with a good 
that undergoes some sacrifice for its own 
good. There are only individual people, 
different individual people, with their 
own individual lives. Using one of these 
people for the benefit of others, uses him 
and benefits the others. Nothing more. 
(ASU pp.32-33).
In Nozick's view, therefore, it is incorrect and misleading to claim that 
a society which can afford to provide for its population should, because 
it is not the society which can afford the provision. The society is not 
an atomic entity with a bank balance from which it can make payments.
The provision does not come from the society, it comes from the individuals 
and those individuals have rights over that which is being taken away from 
them to provide for others. Such provision, therefore, violates the rights 
of individuals and is for that reason, intolerable. This is the case whether 
the provision is for the public welfare or whether it is for the welfare of 
individuals.
Nozick does not discuss directly the question of whether the state 
could compel individuals to adopt non-discriminatory business practices.
10.
From his discussion of equality of opportunity, however, his position 
on this question is clear. Equality of opportunity can be provided,
Nozick suggest, either by worsening the situation of those with greater 
opportunity, or by improving the situation of those with less opportunity. 
Even the second method involves worsening the situations of some, however, 
because resources must be taken from some individuals in order to be used 
to improve the situation of other individuals. Nozick states categorically 
that "holdings to which these people are entitled may not be seized, even 
to provide equality of opportunity for others." (ASU p.235). According to 
Nozick, only voluntary means of attaining equality of opportunity are 
available.
Only the holder of a particular resource may determine how that re­
source is to be used or to whom it is to be transferred. "Often the per­
son entitled to transfer a holding has no special desire to transfer it to
a particular person He chooses to transfer to someone who satisfies a
certain condition...." (ASU p.236). The implication of this passage is 
that the owner of a holding may choose to transfer that holding to any 
particular person or to any person who meets certain» conditions which he 
has determined. Nowhère in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is there any indica­
tion that a person may not choose as one of these conditions that the per­
son to whom he will transfer his holding must be white or must be a Chris­
tian. According to Nozick, this determination of theinext holder of a 
particular holding is the sole jurisdiction of the present holder. He may 
choose the next holder on the basis of whatever conditions he likes. In 
other words, not only is the state prohibited from acting to equalise in­
dividuals' positions, it is also prohibited from acting to equalise indi­
viduals' treatment by other individuals.
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One possible reaction to this is to claim that every individual has 
a right to be considered as a prospective recipient of holdings without 
regard to race, religion, sex, etc. A black man could then claim that 
he has a right to be served in a restaurant that serves everyone except 
blacks. It is clear, however, that Nozick does not accept the existence 
of such 'rights to':
The major objection.to speaking of everyone's 
having a right various things such as equa­
lity of opportunity, life, and so on, and en­
forcing this right, is that these 'rights' re­
quire a substructure of things and materials 
and actions; and other people may have rights 
and entitlements over these. No one has a 
right to something whose realization requires 
certain uses of things and activities that 
other people have rights and entitlements over. 
(ASU p.238).
An individual must exercise his rights within a structure created by 
other people exercising their rights. If an individual wants to achieve 
certain goals which require that other people exercise their rights in a 
particular fashion, then he must convince those other people to co-operate 
voluntarily. He has no right to anything which obligates other people 
to exercise their rights in a particular fashion. The unfairness of equal 
opportunity or even of blatant racial discrimination is not a justification 
for violating the rights of individuals.
More generally, Nozick does not accept that there is a moral principle 
of fairness of which he must take account. It is not that individuals' 
rights override considerations of fairness, it is that considerations of 
fairness are not moral considerations. This is why Nozick's response to 
an example of something which is unfair is to give a context in which what 
was deemed unfair in the example is clearly fair. It seems unfair that a 
person should benefit from his natural (and therefore deserved) talents.
But it does not seem unfair that a person should be chosen by his future 
spouse on the basis of his natural (and therefore undeserved) talents.
(ASU pp.235-238).
The moral judgement which allows a certain degree of paternalism on 
the part of the state is explicitly rejected by Nozick.
My nonpaternalistic position hdlds that 
someone may choose (or permit another) to 
do to himself anything, unless he has acqui­
red an obligation to some third party not to 
do or allow it. (ASU p.58 - Nozick's emphasis).
Manufacturers cannot be prevented by the state from producing dangerous 
drugs and individuals cannot be prevented from using them. The justifica­
tion for this view rests on the rights which individuals have over them­
selves. The state has no right to determine for an individual what he 
can and cannot do.
Similarly, passing laws which regulate the activity of individuals 
in the public interest would be totally rejected by Nozick. As with 
'public welfare' Nozick would claim that there is no public with interests. 
There are only separate individuals with separate interests and the rights 
of some individuals may not be sacrificed or violated in the interest of 
other individuals.
These arguments which Nozick offers as responses to the claim that 
the minimal state is contrary to considered moral judgements have a com­
pelling logic which makes them difficult to dismiss. Even if we remain 
skeptical of the rejection of the existence of a social entity with goals, 
interests and a welfare, we must still contend with the moral constraints 
formed by the inviolability of the individual and the existence of natural 
rights. Such a reaction, however, misses the point of examining Nozick's 
theory. It is precisely because the notion of the inviolability of the 
individual and the exitence of natural rights is so intuitively appealing 
that Nozick's conclusions present a problem at all. The conflict which
Anarchy, State, and Utopia presents is a conflict between a foundation 
composed of principles which have intuitively appealing consequences 
and the consequences of that foundation, which are counterintuitive.
In order to resolve this conflict it is necessary to examine in 
greater depth the two principle aspects of the foundation of Nozick's 
theory. In this thesis I will accept the inviolability of the individual 
and examine the notion of natural rights. I choose this path for several 
reasons: first of all, there is a sense in which the inviolability of the 
individual must either be accepted or it must be rejected entirely. Either 
individuals are inviolable or they are not; it is difficult to see a middle 
course. The existence of natural rights on the other hand, may be accepted 
without thereby being committed to the particular natural rights which un­
derpin Nozick's theory. The second, and more important reason, for accep­
ting the inviolability of the individual and questioning Nozick's use of 
natural rights is that the unappealing conclusions of his theory rest to 
a greater extent on his use ofnnatural rights. The entitlement conception 
of justice rests solidly on the natural rights to acquire, hold and dispose 
of property. More generally, however, Nozick himself indicates the impor­
tance of natural rights to his theory in the first paragraph of the preface;
Individuals have rights and there are things 
no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights). So strong and far- 
reaching are these rights that they raise the 
question of what, if anything, the state and 
its officials may do. (ASU p.ix).
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The concept of a right is both complex and controversial. Rights 
are encountered in different areas of human activity and in ordinary 
speech the meanings of 'rights' are many and varied. It is not even clear 
that there is one concept of a right from which all other concepts and
usages of 'rights' are derived. For the purposes of this thesis, how­
ever, it is not necessary that the concept of a right be made entirely 
perspicuous. A working definition that includes those aspects of a right 
which are particularly relevant to natural rights will suffice. This will 
leave many questions about rights unanswered but it will provide a basis 
from which to evaluate Nozick's use of natural rights.
In formulating a working definition of a right, it is important to 
recognise that certain concepts which are often used in such definitions 
are as much in need of explication as the concept of a right. For instance, 
rights are often defined in terms of claims. Yet the notion of a claim in­
volves the concept of a right. Even the concepts of duty and obligation
fall into this category. To define a right as a state of affairs in which 
some person or persons has an obligation or duty to the right-holder is to 
leave the concept of a right undefined. What is an obligation? Is is to 
be defined as a state of affairs in which the person to whom the Obliga­
tion is owed has some sort of right? The difficulty with the concepts of 
rights, claims, duties and obligations is that they all involve some set 
of princples, such as moral or legal, by reference to which talk of rights, 
duties, etc., makes sense.
My task, therefore, is to arrive at a definition of a right which is 
neutral with respect to the sets of principles that establish rights. For 
the sake of simplicity, I will concern myself only with tights that are 
similar to natural rights. This will eliminate those rights which, for
example, are created by the actions of individuals. Natural rights are 
never created by the actions of individuals (though it may be the case 
that some natural rights are 'brought into force' by the actions of indi­
viduals) . The definition which I will offer will not be adequate for 
rights to receive or rights which obligate ot±ier people to perform speci­
fic actions. My interest is with rights that obligate people' not to in­
terfere with the right-holder's performance of a particular action or set 
of actions. I will leave open the question of whether a natural right can 
obligate people to perform a particular action for the right-holder. An 
example of such a right (if indeed it is a right) is the right to receive 
assistance when in need. Clearly, Nozick believes there can be no such 
rights and since I am concerned to evaluate his use of natural rights, I 
will not dispute the poiht.
The sort of rights which Nozick thinks are natural rights are rights 
to perform certain actions. For example, the rights of a property owner
to use, manage and sell his property. Although many of the rights which
Nozick believes people have as natural rights are not obviously rights 
to perform a certain action, all such rights can be reformulated as rights 
to perform certain actions. For example, the right to own property, which 
is not obviously a right to perform certain actions, can be reformulated 
as the right to perform those actions which constitute acquiring property 
and the right to perform those actions which constitute owning or control­
ling property. There is no separate right to be a property owner. Simi­
larly, there is no separate right to be recognised as the owner of a par­
ticular holding. That right is simply the right not to be interfered with 
in the exercise of the rights of ownership. These rights of ownership 
are rights to do certain things with or to that holding. It may be con­
venient to talk of rights in terms other than the right to perform a
certain action but it is not necessary.
My working definition, then, of a right to perform certain actions 
is as follows:-
A state of affairs in which person P has 
a right to perform action A is a state of 
affairs in which every other person either 
refrains from interfering with or prevent­
ing P's performance of A or violates the 
principles which established P's right to 
perform A.
This definition, it might be claimed, does not say a great deal about 
what a right is. The point of this definition, however, is to capture 
those elements of 'a right’ which are common to natural rights, legal 
rights, moral rights, rights in games, etc. It ignores, therefore, many 
questions which require different answers depending on what type of right 
is being discussed. For example, the issues of what may’obe done to pre­
vent a violation of a right and of what may be done in reaction to a vio­
lation of a right cannot be dealt with without reference to particular 
types of rights. In a game, the fact that a player has a particular right 
may not mean (i.e. entail) anything more than that a violation of that 
right is against the rules of the game.
Several additional comments are appropriate here. This definition
ignores the question of whether individuals are the only bearers of rights,
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Perhaps corporations, or groups of people can also be the bearers of 
rights. For the purpose of this thesis, however, this question can be 
ignored because we are concerned with the natural rights of individuals. 
This definition also ignores the question of whether it is the case with 
every right to perform an action that every person other than the right­
holder must refrain from interfering with the performance of that action.
In a game, for example, a player's right to perform a certain action may 
be consistent with the umpire's or referee's right to interfere with any 
action of any player. The fact that a particular person or persons are
not obligated by an individual's right to perform a certain action is a 
result of thier having a special status established by the same set of 
principles that established the individual's rights. No such special 
status, however, frees any person from the obligations which result from 
an individual’s natural rights. Natural rights concern individuals as 
individuals and not individuals as referees or as umpires.
Another question which this definition does not deal with is whether
all rights to perform an action are always 'in force'. Is it the case that 
*
all individuals hold every natural right at all times? This question-is 
really two different questions. (1) Can individuals who are not in a pos­
ition, or do not have the capacity, to perform certain actions be properly 
said to have the right to perform those actions? (2) Are there, or can 
there be, any mitigating factors which limit or override an individual's 
natural rights? The answer to the first question is clearly 'yes' because 
the right to perform an action does not entail nor does it depend on the 
capacity to perform it. (This point is discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter.) The second question has two answers. The first answer 
concerns mitigating factors that are external to the principles which 
establish natural rights. An example of external mitigating factors might 
be natural catastrophes. Since it is Nozick's position that the natural 
rights of individuals cannot be"overridden by external considerations.
*I ignore here the question of whether every individual holds every natural 
right. This point is not essential to this discussion, however, because 
the restrictions which would be placed on the set of natural rights which a 
given person holds concern that person's rationality. An infant and a 
mental vegetable, therefore, may (and I think do) have a set of natural 
rights which differs from the set held by most individuals.
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I will assume this to be the case. The second answer to this question 
concerns internal considerations. These might be other natural rights 
or some aspect of the principles which establish natural rights. While 
Nozick states explicitly (ASU p.238) that the natural rights of individuals 
do not conflict, he does allow that considerations internal to the prin­
ciples which established natural rights can limit them. (ASU pp.178-182).
I will not deal with the issues raised by this position here. Rather, I 
will discuss them in chapter three.
The most important aspect of this definition in need of clarification 
concerns the sets of principles which establish individuals' rights.
Rights do not exist in a vacuum. They must be grounded in some set of 
principles, thus making moral rights, or legal rights, or natural rights, 
etc. These sets of principles provide the justification for the rights 
which they establish. A legal right is justified by reference to the 
legal system; a moral right by reference to the set of moral principles. 
Similarly, these sets of principles establish obligations, duties, and 
claims. A moral right has a correlative moral obligation or moral duty.
The holder of a moral right has a correlative moral claim. These correla­
tions are determined by the set of moral principles.
The set of principles that establish a given right, also determine
the consequences of and remedies for violations of that right. Whether
%
a violator of an individual's right is required to compensate that indi­
vidual and whether it is justifiable to use coercive measures to prevent 
a violation are settled by reference to the set of principles which es­
tablished that right. With regard to legal rights, these questions are 
easily answered because laws have been passed which establish procedures 
to rectify injustices. With moral and natural rights, however, the situa­
tion is much more complicated. Does the violation of a person s natural 
rights entitle that person to take retributive action? Here too, Nozick 
makes his position clear.
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Nozick follows Locke's conception of the state of nature in assuming that 
any individual has a right to enforce the law of nature and to punish any 
violation of any individual's natural rights. While this point is impor­
tant to the first section of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which Nozick 
deduces the minimal state from the state of nature, it is not essential 
to this thesis. I am not concerned with what may be done to prevent or 
to remedy a violation of an individual's natural rights. What is impor­
tant is that any such violation is a violation of the law of nature and 
is contrary to the principles of justice.
So what are natural rights? Natural rights are rights which are 
established by the principles of the law of nature and as such are pre­
political. Whatever the principles of the law of nature are, they apply 
to all individuals (with certain considerations of rationality). Because 
the law of nature is pre-political, natural rights are not, nor could 
they be, established or altered by the actions of social institutions or 
the actions of groups of individuals. Natural rights are a subset of 
moral rights because the law of nature forms (and must form, for anyone 
who accepts the existence of a law of nature) a part of the principles of 
morality. An infringement on or violation of the law of nature, therefore, 
is immoral as such.
This characterisation of natural rights follows closely the classi-
%
cal treatment of natural rights which is the basis of Nozick's theory.
Yet three main questions must be asked. (1) Are there any natural rights? 
(2) How do we know that a particular right is a natural right? (3) How 
doe we know that we have a particular natural right? Although the first 
question is of fundamental importance to political philosophy and espec­
ially to natural rights theorists such as Locke and Nozick, it is not 
necessary to give a complete answer in this thesis. It is one of the 
assumptions of this thesis that the foundation of Nozick's theory, viz.
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the principle of the inviolability of the individual and individual's 
natural rights, is intuitively appealing. I will assume, therefore, 
that individuals do have natural rights and I will offer only limited 
support.
The limited support which I will offer for the claim that there 
are natural rights is based on an article by H.L.A. Hart, entitled "Are 
There Any Natural Rights?". In this article. Hart claims that, "if there 
are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natu­
ral right, the equal right of all men to be free." (p.53)? My conten­
tion is that the existence of moral rights and moral obligations must 
either be part of or be consequences of some pre-existing moral frame­
work of rights and obligations. By 'pre-existing' I mean that this moral 
framework is not a creation of nor can it be altered by the actions of 
individuals. This moral framework, therefore, is natural in the same 
sense that natural rights are natural.
Those moral rights which are part of the pre-existing moral frame­
work are just those rights which are (or can be) asserted as natural rights, 
For this category of moral rights, often called general rights, my conten­
tion amounts to the claim that asserting the existence of these moral 
rights is tantamount to asserting the existence of natural rights. As
such it does not support the claim that there are natural rights, it
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merely makes explicit the link between natural rights and a category of 
moral rights which are commonly held to exist. To assert, for example, 
that individuals have a (moral) right to worship however they please, or 
a (moral) right to hold whatever political beliefs they please, is to 
assert a general moral right which is a particular application of a natu­
ral right, i.e. the natural right of freedom of belief. Although the 
formulation of natural rights tends to be more general than the formula­
tion of general moral rights, both apply to individuals as individuals 
and both exist prior to the actions of individuals.
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With regard to another category of moral rights, often called 
special rights, ray contention is of greater importance. Moral rights 
that are created by the voluntary actions of individuals entail some 
pre-existing moral framework. The moral nature of such rights is a re­
sult of the application of pre-existing moral principles. More precisely, 
if the voluntary consent of individuals is sufficient to establish moral 
rights and moral obligations, then there must at least exist a natural 
right to enter into morally binding contracts. That promising morally 
obligates the promiser entails a pre-existing, and therefore natural, 
right to obligate oneself and thus limit one's own freedom.
These arguments in support of the claim that there are natural rights 
are not intended as a conclusive defence. They are merely intended to 
show that the existence of natural rights is entailed by our considered 
moral judgements about the moral nature of rights. To question the exis­
tence of (at least some) natural rights is to question the existence of 
(most, if not all) moral rights. (People who have different intuitions 
about the nature of moral rights may not be swayed at all by my arguments.)
The second question above concerns the criteria which establish that
a particular right is a natural right. Some of these have been mentioned
already. A natural right must apply to all individuals qua (rational)
individuals. It is because an individual is an individual that he has
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natural rights. Any right which is a natural right, therefore, must be 
free of references to specific people or specific groups. Also, it must 
not include references to positions which individuals might hold. In 
other words, natural rights do not contain (or at least it must be possi­
ble to formulate them without) terms which classify or otherwise describe 
individuals. Individuals have natural rights and not tall people or pro­
perty owners (except insofar as they are individuals).
Another aspect of natural rights is that they are pre-political.
They do not stem from political or social arrangements or institutions.
22.
It must be possible therefore to formulate natural rights without’re­
course to purely political language. The right to vote, for example, is 
not a natural right. It is (or could be) a particular application of a 
natural right, viz. the natural right to choose to whom one transfers 
authority over particular matters. An action which arises from politi­
cal or social arrangements or institutions cannot be the subject of a 
natural right. It can, however, be covered by a natural right. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it will not be difficult to determine what rights 
are natural rights. The difficulty arises in answering question (3) 
above.
This question concerns the justification for the claim that indivi­
duals actually have a particular natural right. This is of fundamental 
importance to this thesis because in order to evaluate Nozick's use of 
natural rights, it is necessary to determine whether individuals actually 
have the natural rights which Nozick attributes to them. In other words, 
we must determine what constitutes a justification for the claim that in­
dividuals actually have a particular natural right?
The process of justifying the claim that individuals have a particu­
lar natural right is much the same as the process of justifying any moral 
claim. A sound argument must be constructed which has as its conclusion
the assertion that individuals have the natural right in question. It is
%
important to emphasise that the desired conclusion does not involve the 
assertion that the natural right in question should be held by individuals. 
Nor does it involve a conditional such as: this natural right is necessary,
if we are to .....  Moral claims about what people should have or how
they should be treated enter into the argument only as premises (if at all) 
The conclusion is not a moral judgement or intuition, it is a moral prin­
ciple. Natural rights are part of the set of moral principles by refer­
ence to which we make moral judgements.
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What are the natural rights that Nozick believes are held by indi­
viduals? In order to answer this question we will examine the section 
of Anarchy, State, and Utopia in which Nozick develops his theory of dis­
tributive justice, or, what he claims is a neutral term for the same thing, 
justice in holdings. The theory which Nozick offers he calls the entitle­
ment theory and it consists of three principles: (1) The principle of 
justice in acquisition governs the intial acquisition of holdings,-
(2) The principle of justice in transfer governs the transference of 
holdings; (3) The principle of the rectification of injustice governs the 
manner in which violations of either of the first two principles are to 
be handled. The holdings which a person is entitled to are determined by 
these three principles. The entitlement theory of distributive justice 
maintains that a given distribution of holdings is just, if every indivi­
dual possesses all those and only those holdings to which they have enti­
tlements.
Although Nozick does not specify the details of his three principles 
of distributive justice, it is clear that they are based on (and therefore 
entail) natural rights. The principle of justice in acquisition, for 
example, specifies for each potential (i.e. unheld) holding an action, or 
set of actions, which constitutes the acquisition of that holding. In 
other words, for any potential holding there is an action or a set of 
actions the performance of which, by any individual, confers on that indi­
vidual an entitlement, or right, to that holding. Similarly, the principle 
of justice in transfer specifies for each actual (i.e. held) holding an 
action or set of actions which constitutes the transference of that holding 
The specified set of actions may include actions to be performed by the 
transferor and the transferee or by one or the other, (It would be pecu­
liar if the principle of justice in transfer specified actions to be per­
formed only by the transferee bit it is not impossible). When the
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specified actions have been performed by the specified individuals 
(i.e. the transferor and/or the transferee), a transference of the enti­
tlement, or right, to a particular holding has taken place.
The rights to particular holdings conferred by the principles of 
justice in acquisition and in transfer are not natural rights. They are 
not natural rights for two reasons. First of all, they govern specific 
holdings and specific individuals. A right of this sort is conferred 
upon a particular person, i.e. that person who performed the specified 
actions, and is a right to a particular holding. Natural rights are held 
by all individuals and not just 'the individual who performed the speci­
fied actions'. Moreover, natural rights are never rights to particular 
holdings because any holding is ephemeral whereas natural rights are not. 
If a person's right to a particular book were a natural right, then what 
would become of that natural right once the book is destroyed? The natu­
ral right cannot disappear because that would constitute the altering of 
natural rights by the actions of individuals. (Killing an individual 
does not destroy natural rights, it destroys a holder of natural rights. 
Similarly, giving birth to a child does not create natural rights, it 
creates a holder of natural rights.)
This leads directly into the second reason for claiming that the 
rights conferred by the principles of justice in holdings are not natural 
rights. Such rights stem from and are created by the actions of individ­
uals. It is precisely because a person has performed certain actions that 
his right to a particular holding exists. But natural rights cannot be 
created by the actions of individuals. The existence of natural rights 
is independent of the actions of individuals; it is independent of the 
social institutions or arrangements created by individuals. This must be 
so because natural rights are held by individuals by virtue of their being 
individuals and not because of anything they might have done.
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So what are the natural rights entailed by Nozick's three principles of 
justice in holdings? Perhaps the word 'entailed' is misleading because 
the natural rights which Nozick utilises are actually embedded in the 
three principles of justice. The actions specified by each of the prin­
ciples that constitute the acquisition or transference of a holding, or 
the rectification of an injustice, are actions which every individual is 
entitled to perform. In other words, every individual has a right to 
perform those actions which are specified by the three principles of 
justice in holdings. Individuals as such do not have rights to particu­
lar holdings but they do have the right to perform those actions that con­
stitute the acquisition of rights to particular holdings. Similarly, in­
dividuals have the right to perform those action that constitute the tran­
sference of rights to particular holdings. Any individual who interferes 
with another's performance of an action specified by a principle of jus­
tice in holdings is in so doing, violating that principle.
The rights to perform those actions that constitute the acquisition 
or transference of a holding or the rectification of an injustice, as 
specified by the three principles of justice in holdings, are natural 
rights. They are natural rights because they are held by all individuals 
and are not created or altered by the actions of individuals. The speci­
fication of these rights will», not involve references to specific people 
(e.g. the person who did such-and-such) nor will it include references to 
individuals under some description (e.g. those people who are so-and-so). 
Since these rights are embedded in the principles of justice in holdings, 
they exist prior to any social arrangement and, therefore, cannot be 
created or altered by such arrangements.
It-might be claimed that the right to perform those actions which 
constitute the transference of a holding is only held by those individuals 
who actually have holdings to transfer. In that case, the right to perform
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those actions would not be held by all individuals and, at least on my 
definition, would not be a natural right. This is mistaken, however.
While it is true that"those people who have no holdings will not be able 
to perform any actions which can only be performed by those who do have 
holdings, nevertheless, people with no holdings do have the right to per­
form such actions. The right to per form an action does not entail or de­
pend upon the capability to perform it. A person who is physically in­
capable of jumping ten feet off the ground may still be said to have a 
right to jump ten feet off the ground. His possession of such a right 
means that no person may prevent him from jumping ten feet off the ground. 
It does not mean that he can actually do it.
Moreover, the right to transfer holdings one has is a right indivi­
duals have by virtue of their being rational individuals. It is not the 
case that individuals have this right because they have holdings. In 
other words, this right does not stem from having holdings to transfer. 
Except for the fact that they can actually transfer holdings, there is 
nothing particular about individuals who have holdings by virtue of which 
they have the right to transfer those holdings. Whatever establishes the 
right to transfer holdings establishes that right for all individuals.
Thus far, we have discovered where to locate the specific natural 
rights upon which Nozick bases his theory. Unfortunately, they are to be 
found in the specific details of Nozick's three principles of justice in 
holdings and Nozick does not make these details explicit. In order to 
determine what natural rights Nozick believes individuals have, we must 
examine his criticisms of alternative conceptions of distributive justice.
According to Nozick, any theory of distributive justice that contains 
end-state principles must be rejected because the maintenance of the pat­
terned distribution that is entailed by the end-state principles requires 
that the liberty of individuals be infringed upon by the state. Nozick's 
claim that liberty upsets patterns has been interpreted by some people as
being the sole basis of his rejection of patterned conceptions of distri­
butive justice, Cheyney Ryan, in "Yours, Mine, and Ours: Property Rights 
and Individual Liberty" maintains that "what Nozick tries to show is that 
personal liberty upsets patterns: not private property rights, but per­
sonal liberty requires that we adopt an entitlement conception of justice." 
(p.130)^ Ryan’s point is that Nozick is not appealing to the natural 
right of property, which Ryan thinks would not be very telling, but to 
the commitment to (the value of) individual liberty.
It is true that Nozick says "that no end-state principle or distri­
butional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realised 
without continuous interference in people's lives." (ASU p.163). But this 
does not support Ryan's point and to see why it doesn't we must examine 
Nozick's view of liberty. Nozick does not believe that individual liberty 
is a social goal; he does not believe that it is something society should 
attempt to maximise. For Nozick, any infringement on an individual's 
liberty is intolerable. Furthermore, the natural rights of individuals 
determine moral side constraints that establish the area in which it is 
permissible to act.. Since a person is not at liberty to violate these 
side constraints, they also determine the area of individual liberty. It 
is not an infringement on individual liberty to interfere with a person's 
violation of the moral side constraints (e,^. self-defence). Since the 
side constraints are determined by the natural rights of individuals, and 
the area of personal liberty is determined by the moral side constraints, 
it follows that vdiat a person is at libery to do is determined by the 
natural rights of individuals. It is not (morally) permissible to do any­
thing that violates an individual's natural rights and it is (morally) 
permissible to do anything which does not. If, therefore, an infringement 
on individual liberty is not (morally) permissible, it must be because 
such an action violates an individual's natural rights. So, if Nozick
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condemns patterned conceptions of distributive justice because they in­
fringe upon people's liberty, it must be because such infringements con­
stitute violations of natural rights. Unless every infringement on per­
sonal liberty does violate an individual's natural rights, it cannot be 
said that infringements on liberty are wrong as such.
It is clear, therefore, that to claim that patterned conceptions of 
distributive justice must be rejected because of considerations of per­
sonal liberty, is just to claim that they must be rejected because of 
considerations of natural rights. As a result of this, it is possible to 
discern from what Nozick says about p>attemed conceptions of distributive 
justice the specific natural rights he utilises. For if Nozick claims 
that a particular action by the state would infringe upon people's liberty, 
then there must be some corresponding natural right which that action would 
violate.
What, then, are the natural rights which the state would have to vio­
late in order continuously to realise an end-state or distributional pat­
terned principle of justice? To answer this question, we must look at the 
actions vdiich would be required in order continuously to realise such 
principles. For example, taxation is an extremely common method of re­
alising and maintaining distributional patterns. Taxation involves taking 
part of a person's income or part of the returns on his investments. That 
this is rejected as being immoral by Nozick entails that he believes indi­
viduals have a natural right to use, spend, or transfer (all of) their in­
come as well as the returns on their investments. The prohibition on 
making gifts or bequeathing one's holdings is another way of realising and 
maintaining a distributional pattern. That this is unjust entails a natu­
ral righ-t to determine the next owner of one's holdings. Distributional 
patterns can be realised and maintained in many other ways as well. 
Regulations can be placed on how and to what ends a person may use his
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holdings. Regulations can be placed on who is permitted to use a per­
son's holdings. Nozick certainly believes that such regulations would 
constitute gross violations of individuals' natural rights. This entails 
that people have natural rights to perform those actions involved in de­
termining how and to what ends their holdings will be used and who will 
use them. This gives an individual the right to exclude others from using, 
managing or enjoying the benefits of his holdings.
It is not necessary to go through every action the state might take 
to achieve a particular patterned distribution of holdings. It is enough 
to say that any such action will violate individuals' natural rights.
This leaves individuals with a wide range of rights, pertaining to holdings 
Henceforth, we will refer to these as the natural right of property. 
Nozick's conception of the natural right of property is as extensive as it 
could be. An individual has the (natural) right to do with his holdings 
as he chooses within the bounds of the side constraints (e.g. an individual 
cannot use his holdings to do bodily harm to someone else). An individual 
has complete and exclusive control over his holdings. Any interference 
with an individual's perfoirmance of the actions involved in exercising 
control over his holdings is a violation of his natural right of property 
and is intolerable.
One more element of Nozick's conception of the natural right of pro­
perty deserves comment and that concerns what can be property. Nothing 
has yet been said which precludes the exclusion of certain things, such 
as air, music, or ideas, from the realm of what can be owned. It may be 
the case that there is.no way to acquire a right to certain things. A 
detailed specification of the principle of justice in acquisition would 
make clear what can and what cannot be acquired. Although Nozick does 
not provide a detailed specification of this principle, it is clear that 
he believes almost anything can be acquired. The criteria which are
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implicit in his theory are that an individual can acquire property in a 
thing if that thing is such that it can be controlled, used, managed, 
disposed of, etc. While this does not settle the issue for things such 
as air, oceans, and ideas, things such as land and the means of production 
can be acquired. Certainly, nothing can be said to remain in common just 
because it is better for society or because it achieves some,goal. Only 
those things which, at least in some sense, are such that property in them 
cannot be exercised can be excluded from being owned.
The natural right of property is clearly a natural right which Nozick 
believes individuals have. Moreover, he conceives of it as being an ex­
tremely extensive natural right of property. Is this the only right which, 
he thinks people have? What role does the natural right of property have 
in the theory developed in Anarchy, State, and Utopia? Both these ques­
tions can be answered by examining the consequences for the state of this 
extensive natural right of property. The immediate consequence of accep­
ting a natural right of property as extensive as Nozick assumes it to be 
is that the state will be unable to utilise any of the resources possessed 
by individuals. Individuals may choose to transfer to the state particu­
lar holdings either as gifts or in return for some service. The state 
would be forbidden, however, from seizing, regulating the use of, or in 
any way controlling an individual’s property (without that individual's 
consent). As a result of this, the state could have no redistributive 
function, nor could it have any regulatory function. The state would be 
confined to the narrow functions of the minimal state.
An extensive natural right of property vests complete control of all 
those things which can be controlled (in the relevant sense) in the hands 
of individuals. When this is combined with the Kantian principle of the 
inviolability of the individual, the state is left with nothing to control 
and, therefore, with no power, save that which is voluntarily transferred
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to it by individuals. These two principles form the foundation of 
Nozick's theory because they place the control of all things and of 
all individuals in the hands of individuals. In order to evaluate Nozick's 
theory, it is essential that the justification of the extensive natural 
right of property be examined. It is this task which is the concern of 
the next two chaoters.
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CHAPTER THREE
In the previous chapter, we saw that Nozick's assertion that the 
only state which can be justified is the minimal state rests on two 
principles. The first is the Kantian principle of the inviolability of 
the individual and the second is the natural right of extensive private 
property. By maintaining these two principles, Nozick has placed the com­
plete and exclusive control of people and (most, if not all) things 
firmly and solely in the hands of the individual. Each individual has as 
a natural right the complete and exclusive power over himself and his 
property (within the bounds of the side constraints). The state, on the 
other hand, has no natural rights and therefore no right of control or
power which is not derived from the natural rights of individuals.
The state can only control those things which are transferred to it by 
individuals or which it gains through free contractual arrangements with 
individuals. (One possible exception to this is the right Nozick claims 
the state has to prohibit, and therefore to act to prevent, the indepen­
dent enforcement of the Law of Nature. Nozick claims that "an indepen­
dent might be prohibited from privately exacting justice because his pro­
cedure is known to be too risky and dangerous.... or because his procedure
isn't known not to be risky." (ASU p.88). Although I think this causes
great problems for Nozick's theory, I will not pursue them in this thesis.) 
Since the state can only have those rights which are transferred to it by 
individuals, and since individuals do not have 'rights to' (i.e. rights 
which require other individuals to perform specific actions), the state 
cannot legitimately attain any of the characteristics which would make 
it a more than minimal state.
It is not difficult to see exactly how important the natural right 
of property is to Nozick's theory. It is also not difficult to see how 
damaging to his case it would be if a successful attack were made against 
his conception of that natural right of property. Considering the
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vulnerability of his theory to an attack of this kind, it is surprising 
that Nozick does not provide an explicit justification for his conception 
of the natural right of property. What he does, instead, is make a number 
of comments in the course of his book which indicate lines of argument that 
can be brought to the defence of his conception of the natural right of pro­
perty. Although Nozick does not explicitly defend his claims about pro­
perty, implicit in the development of his theory are certain specific argu­
ments which support his case.
The arguments that can be gleaned from Anarchy, State, and Utopia which 
support extensive private property as a natural right, fall into two broad 
categories. On the one hand, many of Nozick's statements concerning property 
appeal to the Kantian principle of the inviolability of the individual. On 
the other hand, Nozick relies on arguments concerning human labour, which, 
at times, parallel arguments used by Locke. An example of a statement that 
indicates and implicitly relies on an argument of the first type is the fol­
lowing. Nozick says that taxing a person's earnings, "is like forcing the 
person to work n hours for another's purpose." (ASU p.169). Here Nozick is 
claiming that taxation is unjust because it involves using one person as a 
means to another's end. This obviously violates the Kantian imperative. 
Nozick's rejection of taxation also indicates an argument of the second type. 
Taxing a person's earnings is the same as taking part of the product of his 
labour. Taking part of the product of a person's labour is unjust because 
it violates that person's (natural) right to the entirety of the product of 
his labour.
It is not always a simple matter to construct an argument that is im­
plied by a given statement or set of statements. Nevertheless, in order to 
evaluate Nozick's claim that individuals have a natural right to extensive 
private property, the two categories of arguments mentioned above must be 
examined. These two categories of arguments do not exhaust the arguments 
which can, and have, been brought to bear in support of property rights, but 
they do exhaust the arguments which are appropriate for
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consideration in this thesis. This is not because they are the only 
arguments which are implicit in what Nozick says in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia. The fact that Nozick does not indicate other arguments does not 
rule out the possibility that other arguments could be used to support 
his case. But the other arguments which have been offered in defence of 
extensive private property are not relevant to Nozick's case because each 
of them conflicts, in one way or another, with the foundation of Nozick’s 
theory.
It is too large a task to defend this claim fully as that would re­
quire examining a great many arguments. I will, however, show that two 
extremely common lines of argument in support of extensive private pro­
perty could not be used to support Nozick's case (ignoring the question 
of whether they are good arguments or not), These two lines of arguments 
are the arguments from utility and the arguments from liberty.
Arguments from utility cannot be used by Nozick to justify extensive 
private property because such arguments assert that private property rights 
are a means to an end.  ^The particular end will vary depending on the 
conception of utility adopted in the argument, but the justification will 
always be that property rights are a means to an end. This precludes the 
use of an argument from utility in the defence of Nozick's position.
There are three interrelated reasons for this. First of all, justifying 
private property as a means to an end is inconsistent with the entitle­
ment conception of distributive justice. If private property is justified 
because it maximises some conception of utility, then a particular distri­
bution of holdings must be judged on the basis of unhistorical principles. 
Even if the position taken is that the system of private property rights 
is justified on the basis of a utilitarian argument and not particular 
property rights in particular things, it is still the case that a utili­
tarian goal is relevant to the justness of the distribution of holdings.
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In other words, if private property rights are justified in order to meet 
criteria of utility, then the justness of anything must meet those same 
criteria.
The scond reason for rejecting arguments from utility as being ir­
relevant to Nozick's theory is contained in Nozick's discussion of moral 
side constraints and moral goals. Nozick explicitly rejects the treat­
ment of moral concerns as moral goals. The non-violation of rights is 
not, according to Nozick, something to be maximised. Rights form moral 
constraints upon the actions of individuals and any violation is prohi­
bited and is unjust as such. This position is a rejection of consequen- 
tialist arguments for rights, of which utilitarian justifications are an 
example. Arguments from utility do not claim that the violation of pro­
perty rights is wrong as such. They assert that property rights should 
not be violated because, and only insofar as, the non-violation of pro­
perty rights achieves some specified goal, viz. the maximisation of some 
conception of utility.
Thirdly, although arguments from utility can be used to justify 
private property rights, they cannot be used to establish a natural right 
of property. Natural rights are held by individuals by virtue of their 
being individuals and not because of considerations of utility. Natural 
rights cannot be based on the claim that if individuals have natural 
rights, some goal will be achieved. Arguments from utility can only show 
that property rights conform with or are required by considerations of 
morality, which are (a subset of) utilitarian considerations. Natural 
rights are not required by considerations of morality, they are considera­
tions of morality. For these three reasons, arguments that attempt to 
justify private property rights on the basis of considerations of utility 
are simply hot relevant to Nozick's theory.
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For many of the same reasons, arguments that attempt to justify 
private property rights be appealing to the goal of maximising (personal) 
liberty are also irrelevant to Nozick's theory. if liberty is construed 
as something to be maximised, then the same three points which were made 
against arguments from utility are applicable. The entitlement theory 
of distributive justice cannot be based on the goal of maximising liberty. 
Furthermore, a natural right of property cannot be established on the 
basis of arguments which show that property rights are required in order 
to maximise liberty.
Nozick, of course, does not construe liberty as something to be 
maximised. For him, the non-violation of personal liberty is a moral 
constraint upon the actions of individuals. This is the case because a 
violation of an individual's liberty entails a violation of an individual's 
natural rights. If an action does not violate anyone's natural rights, 
then it does not violate anyone's personal liberty and it is not morally 
prohibited. On this view, it would be circular to attempt to establish 
the natural right of property on the basis of personal liberty. What an 
individual is at liberty to do is determined by natural rights. How then 
can natural rights be determined by consideration of liberty?
It might be argued that when liberty is appealed to as a justifica­
tion of natural rights, it is not liberty as defined by individuals' 
natural rights, but liberty defined as (roughly) doing what one wants 
without interference from others. I think it is clear that Nozick would 
reject this conception of liberty for the reasons I have already stated. 
Moreover, it is not clear that this conception of liberty is relevant to 
arguments concerning morality. If liberty is appealed to in the context 
of arguments concerning morality, must it not be 'liberty' construed as 
doing what'one wants within the constraints of morality? Even if we 
accept this conception, however, it is doubtful that by appealing to it
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we could justify an extensive system of private property. As Gerry 
Cohen states in "Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat":
7
"private property always limits liberty", (p. 1 2 ) This is because private 
property limits severely what an individual can (is at liberty to) do 
with what is someone else's property. It is only by using natural rights 
to delimit individual liberty that this conclusion is avoided. The natu­
ral right of (private) property does not limit liberty if liberty is con­
strued as doing what one wants without violating the moral side constraints 
established by individuals' natural rights.
Neither the arguments from utility nor the arguments from liberty 
could be used by Nozick to support his contention that individuals have 
an extensive natural right of property. This does not, of course, mean 
that arguments from utility and arguments from liberty are irrelevant to 
political philosophy. Nor does it mean that such arguments could not be 
used to justify a system of private property rights. Nozick's theory re­
quires an argument to establish a natural right of property and one which 
is not in conflict with any part of the foundation of his theory.
The rejection of these two lines of argument is not sufficient to 
establish that the only arguments which can be used to support Nozick's 
claim that individuals have a natural right of property either stem from 
the inviolability of the individual or are based on human labour. There 
are other lines of argument which have not been considered. I will assume, 
however, that all these other lines of argument would also prove to be of 
no use to Nozick. In support of this assumption I offer only one point.
In order to be relevant to Nozick's theory, any argument must attempt to 
establish a natural right of property and not attempt to justify (i.e. 
show that the dictates of morality require) a system of private property 
rights. This excludes any argument which concludes '....therefore a 
system of private property rights is required (or'is needed', or 'is nece­
ssary', or 'should exist' etc.)...' Natural rights are not a means to an
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end, just as morality is not a means to an end. Natural rights may 
achieve an end but that is not why individuals have them. Individuals 
have natural rights because they are individuals capable of rational 
thought. To say that natural rights are a means to an end is to say that 
they are accorded to individuals because they are (in someone's judgement) 
the best way of achieving that end. But natural rights are not accorded, 
nor are they justified. Natural rights are discovered. In order to be 
relevant to Nozick's theory, an argument must conclude: 'therefore indi­
viduals have a natural right of property’. A conclusion of this form’must 
be deduced from other natural rights or from some other aspect of the law 
of nature. Both the arguments from the inviolability of the individual 
and the arguments from human labour attempt to deduce the natural right 
of property from other natural rights. In the first case, from the natu­
ral right an individual has not to be used as a means to another's end; 
and in the second case, from the natural right an individual has in his 
own person. (Although the first natural right might be questioned, I 
will accept Nozick's view that it is entailed by the principle of the in­
violability of the individual.)
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the arguments 
for a natural right of property which rest on considerations of human 
labour. The next chapter will be devoted to an examination of the argu­
ments which rely on considerations of the inviolability of the individual.
The most celebrated exposition of the labour theory of property acqu­
isition is contained in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government.
Locke attempted "to shew, how Men might come to have a property in seve­
ral parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that without 
any express Compact of all the Commoners." (Bk.II,sect.25). Although 
Nozick does not explicitly rely on Locke's arguments to support the ex­
tensive natural right of property, he does assume at least some elements
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of Locke's theory of acquisition.' Moreover, Nozick's theory adopts much 
of the Lockean framework. Nozick's conception of the state of nature, 
for example, is explicitly attributed to Locke. This, and the other as­
pects of Locke's T'fjo Treatises of Government which Nozick utilises form 
an integral part of Anarchy, State, and Utopia.
Locke's theory of acquisition is developed in the chapter "Of Pro­
perty". In that chapter, Locke offers several different arguments in 
support of private property rights. While Locke clearly puts more empha­
sis on one of these than on the others, all are relevant to this discus­
sion. The most important and the most often quoted of Locke's arguments 
begigs with the assertion that "Man has a Property in his own Person.
This no Body has any Right to but himself." (Bk.II,Sect.27). From this 
Locke derives the property right each person has in his own labour.
"The Labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly 
his." (Bk.II,Sect.27). Locke then says that something a man has laboured 
to change from its natural state, to remove from the state of nature,
"he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own." (Bk.II,Sect.27). Thereby, Locke concludes, he makes it his property.
Locke qualifies this argument with several stipulations vhich apply 
equally to his other arguments. First of all, Locke means by "labour", 
useful work intended to result in some benefit. Secondly, property is 
only established when "there is enough, and as good left in common for 
others." (Bk.II,Sect.27). Thirdly, one's property is limited to "as much 
as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils."
(Bk.II,Sect.31). The first qualification is of crucial importance to two 
of Locke's other arguments. Its purpose for this argument is to delimit 
the type of human activity which can establish property in a thing. When 
a person takes something out of its natural state by labouring on it, he 
is doing more than simply changing it by some physical activity. He is
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engaged in purposeful work which is intended to improve something. This 
is not to say that if the change is not beneficial, then the activity is 
not labour. It is the intent to improve that is relevant. Of course, a 
person may labour on something in order to make it worse. Someone who 
works to destroy a building is doing this. But if 'improving something' 
is construed as 'making it more suitable for some specified purpose', or 
more generally, as 'changing it in order to achieve some specified goal', 
then even a detroyer of buildings is a labourer.
The second stipulation is of particular importance because it is a 
proviso which Nozick believes will be contained in some form, in any ade­
quate theory of justice in acquisition. This proviso has been interpreted 
in different ways by different philosophers and Nozick chooses a particu­
larly narrow interpretation. One of the difficulties with interpreting 
this proviso is that Locke, at the end of the chapter "Of Property", claims 
that the introduction of money, which was done by 'tacit agreement', makes 
appropriations permissible that would otherwise have violated the proviso. 
Neither Locke nor Nozick view this proviso as a major constraint on the 
acquisition of property. I will not argue here for one interpretation or 
another. Rather, I will treat the proviso as a stipulation involving in 
some way the effect that an individual's acquisition of property has on 
others. Later in this chapter, I will make more specific comments on 
this proviso. The third stipulation is a nonwaste condition and since it 
is doubtful that Nozick would accept such a stipulation, I will not consi­
der it in this thesis.
Following his main argument, Locke presents a number of other argu­
ments. These arguments do not have a great deal of independent weight 
and their function is largely to complement, in one way or another, his 
central argument. Some of these arguments are no more than short state­
ments of a semi-political nature. For example, Locke claims "that he who
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appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase 
the common stock of Mankind." (Bk.II,Sect.37). Locke is not here claiming 
that private property is justified because it increases the common stock. 
Such an argument, in any case, could not establish a natural right of pro­
perty. The importance of this statement is to show that the exercising 
of private property rights is good for mankind because it increases the 
common stock. It has much more political significance than it does philo­
sophical .
Of the remaining arguments that Locke offers in "Of Property", three 
are worthy of comment. In the first of these, Locke claims that the earth, 
its fruits and beasts, were given to mankind in common "yet being given 
for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them 
some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to 
any particular Man." (Bk.II,Sect.26). Locke goes on to argue (Bk.II,
Sect.29) that requiring the explicit consent of every commoner is totally 
impractical and would make life (almost) impossible. "If such a consent 
as that was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had 
given him." (Bk.II,Sect.28). Locke is offering the following argument.
What is held in common is (given by God) for man to use to support and sus­
tain himself. In order to use something held in common, any man must(be 
able to) appropriate it. If man is to appropriate something held in com­
mon in order to sustain himself, it must be (the case that it can be) ap­
propriated without the explicit consent of all commoners.
Locke completes this argument by giving a supporting example. "He 
that is nourished by the Acorns he pickt up under an Oak, or the Apples 
he gathered from the Trees in the Wood, has certainly appropriated them 
to himself." (Bk.II,Sect.28). Previously, Locke had claimed that in or­
der to use something held in common, there must be a way of appropriating 
it. Here Locke is showing that a person who has used what was held in
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common, as for example, when he easts the fruits of the earth, has clearly 
appropriated them. (It is therefore not necessary to assume that God 
gave what is held in common to mankind to use. It is enough to suppose 
that mankind must use it and that using what is held in common entails 
appropriating it.) Locke goes on to ask: "When did they begin to be his?" 
(Bk.II,Sect.28). He answers that "'tis plain, if the first gathering 
made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction 
between them and common." (Bk.II,Sect.28).
The importance of this argument is at least partially due to the 
support it gives to Locke's main arguments. It creates a context in 
which Locke's main argument is compelling. It does not, however, have 
any independent weight because of at least three problems. Firstly,
Locke claims that a person who eats acorns has clearly appropriated them. 
If by this Locke means only that he has used them, then nothing of impor­
tance follows from it. If, on the other hand, Locke is claiming that he 
has property in the acoms, then it is not clear what follows from it.
For once the acorns are eaten, presumably they would be covered by his 
natural right of property in himself. Anyone who attempted to use or con­
trol these acoims would have to violate his right to exclusive control of 
his own person. Whether or not the acorns remain independent entities 
after being eaten which are either unowned or owned and whether or not 
they become the property of the eater are questions with no clear answers. 
Moreover, I see no obvious way of answering them.
The second problem with this argument is that the example used to 
make Locke's point is a very narrow one. While our intuition is strong 
that an individual has property in something he has eaten (though this 
may be because it becomes part of him), our intuition about most other 
things "used" by individuals is much weaker. Does an individual have pro­
perty in a house he has built? This is just a restatement of the original
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question. The example, which is supposed to be a clear case, is a very 
limited one. Even if we accept that a person has property in what he 
has eaten, nothing much follows.
The third problem concerns Locke's claim that it is the initial 
labouring which puts a distinction between what someone has property in 
and what is held in common. It is difficult to determine exactly what 
Locke means by this. In a trivial sense this must be true. The fact 
that an individual has laboured on something distinguishes it from what 
he has not laboured on. But how does this distinction establish his right 
to what he has laboured on? What Locke says is that a person who is 
nourished by acorns has appropriated (i.e. has property in) them and this 
appropriation (i.e. right) is established by the initial gathering of the 
acoms (i.e. the initial labouring) . The reason he gives for this is that: 
"if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could." (Bk.II, 
Sect.28) . Even if we accept that a person has property in what he eats, 
why is it not possible that this right is established by the act of eat­
ing? The initial labouring puts a distinction between what he has laboured 
on and what he has not laboured on and the act of eating what he has 
laboured on puts a distinction between what he has eaten and what he has 
not eaten. Why should the first distinction create a property right and 
not the second? Why should either?
The second of Locke's additional arguments begins in the same way 
as the first. Every individual has property in himself and therefore his 
labour is his property. The derivation of property in things laboured on 
from this, however, proceeds differently. Locke claims that the value of 
a thing laboured on is almost entirely due to the labour. "Of the Pro­
ducts of the Earth useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of 
labour." (Bk.II,Sect.40). Locke immediately declares this a gross under­
estimation and says that 99/100 of their value is due to labour. The con­
clusion of this argument is that a person is entitled to property in
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something he has laboured on.
It is important to state that Locke does not actually offer this 
argument, although it has been attributed to him.* Lawrence Becker, for
g
example, in Property Rights constructs this argument as an important 
variant of Locke's main argument. Yet Locke's stated purpose in claiming 
that 99/100 of the value of a thing laboured on is due to the effects of 
labour, is to explain why it is not peculiar that labouring on something 
held in common establishes a property right in it. Whether or not Locke 
intended this claim to form the basis for a variant of his main argument, 
Becker's claim that such a variant is important deserves comment.
Becker discusses this variant of Locke's main argument together with 
another variant, which is the third additional argument I will consider. 
This other variant is based on the 'pains' that a person takes in labour­
ing to remove something from the state in which nature left it. Locke 
claims that a person "ought not to meddle with what was already improved 
by another's labour; if he did, 'tis plain he desired the benefit of 
another's Pains, which he had no right to." (Bk.II,Sect.34). Both these 
variant arguments conclude that a person who labours on something and thus 
takes it out of the state in which nature left it is entitled to property 
in it. 'Entitled to property in it' does not mean 'has a right to pro­
perty in it'. What is meant here is something like 'has a moral case which 
supports his claim to have property in it'. In other words, it is not 
being claimed that a person has a right to have a property right, but 
that he should have a property right.
Clearly, Becker is correct in treating these two arguments as suppor­
ting and possibly justifying some system of property rights. Both argue 
from intuitively appealing premises to the conclusion that a person is 
entitled to or deserves what he creates or labours on. The problem, with
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respect to this thesis, which these two arguments present, is that they 
do not, nor could they, establish a natural right of property. Indivi­
duals do not have natural rights because they deserve them. To maintain 
that they do have natural rights because they deserve them is to claim 
that natural rights are justified on the basis of a moral judgement 
(whose moral judgement?). Yet this is to confuse the nature of natural 
rights. A justification for a natural right would be needed only if the ques­
tion of whether individuals have that natural right, depended on human 
actions. But this is not the case. Natural rights are not accorded to 
individuals (by whom would they be accorded?) they are simply (and natu­
rally) held by individuals. Natural rights are not in need of a justifica­
tion, all that is needed is their discovery. An argument based on strongly 
held intuitions that concludes that individuals are entitled to or deserve 
a certain right, does, of course, complement an argument which attempts 
to establish that individuals have that right as a natural right. But it 
is the latter argument that is specifically relevant to Nozick's theory.
Of the arguments expounded by Locke in his Second Treatise of Gov­
ernment, only one presents the possibility of establishing a natural right 
of property. For the purpose of clarity, I will restate this argument 
before examining it:
(I): (1) Every individual has a natural right of
property in his own person.
(2) Every individual has a natural right of 
property in his own labour.
(3) Every individual who labours on something 
and thereby changes it from its natural 
state has mixed it with or joined it to 
his labour.
(4) Every individual who mixes his labour with 
or joins it to something acquires property 
in that thing.
(5) Every individual has a natural right of pro­
perty in something he labours on, thereby 
changing it from its natural state.
Premise (1) is an assertion that individuals have a particular 
natural right. Since the point of this exercise is to establish that 
individuals have a natural right of property, is JLt not question begging 
to assume that individuals have a natural right of property? The natu­
ral right of property asserted in (1) is a very particular one. It is 
not the natural right of property on which Nozick rests his entitlement 
theory of distributive justice because it does not concern actions that 
constitute the initial acquisition of holdings. A person does not ac­
quire property in himself because his own person is not something that is 
ever held in common. Even if we grant Nozick the natural right asserted 
in (1), he will still have to argue for a natural right to appropriate 
that which is held in common. For without such a right, the entitlement 
theory never gets off the ground.
Yet one might still protest that if Nozick must assume the existence 
of one natural right (of property) in order to establish the existence of 
another natural right (of property), then he cannot hope adequately to 
support his theory. Even if a satisfactory argument based on (1) can be 
made, is the defence of Nozick's theory any stronger? Are we more certain 
that individuals have a natural right of property in themselves than we 
are that individuals have a natural right to appropriate that which is 
held in common? If argument (1) is to have'"any role in the defence of 
Nozick's theory, these questions must be answered.
The natural right of property in oneself gives each individual the
right to control himself. More importantly, it gives each individual the 
right to (act to) exclude others from exercising control of his own per­
son. No individual can use or possess or determine what will happen to
or with another individual (without the other individual's consent). As 
such, the.major part of the natural right of property in oneself follows 
from (Nozick's interpretation and treatment of) the Kantian principle of
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the inviolability of the individual, (This is just to say that accep­
ting ((Nozick's claim)) that the individual is inviolable commits one 
to accepting that the individual has at least mosj: of the rights which 
the natural right of property in oneself would give him), That indivi­
duals cannot be used (without their consent) in order to achieve ano­
ther's ends entails that individuals have the right to determine for 
themselves to what ends they can be used. Moreover, the natural right 
of property in oneself, including those aspects of it that are not entailed 
by the Kantian principle, is as intuitively compelling as the principle 
of the inviolability of the individual. I will suppose, therefore, that 
individuals do have a natural right of property in themselves.
What is the natural right of property in oneself? Is it the right 
to complete and exclusive control of oneself? There is some question as 
to whether the natural right of property in oneself entitles individuals 
to do anything (e.g. kill, maim, etc) to themselves. In particular, it 
is not obviously the case that such a natural right entitles individuals 
to sell themselves permanently into slavery or to transfer some of their 
rights in themselves (eog* the right to determine what one says, eats, 
etCo) to other individuals. This point is of great significance to No­
zick because if having property in oneself does not give one complete and 
exclusive control of oneself, then considerable doubt is thrown on the 
proposition that having property in an object gives one complete and ex­
clusive control of that object. Yet, this proposition is crucial to 
Nozick's case.
Of course, Nozick states explicitly (ASU p,58) that an individual 
is entitled to do whatever he wants to or with himself (though he cannot 
violate the side constraints by throwing himself on top of someone).
(In this respect, Nozick's position differs markedly from that of Locke 
and, for quite different reasons, that of Kant as well.) He also states
48,
(ASU pp,281-290) that individuals have the right to transfer some or 
all of their rights in themselves to other people. Although Nozick does 
not argue for these positions ("A person may choose to do himself, I shall 
suppose.„„oo” - ASU p.58) I will not question them. Rather, I will assume 
that the natural right of property in oneself gives every individual com­
plete and exclusive and permanent control of himself. Every individual 
has the right to do whatever he wants with and to himself (within the 
side contraints) including selling himself into permanent slavery. I 
assume this not because questioning it would obviously be fruitless, but 
because it is not clear how questioning it would proceed. How does one 
determine exactly how extensive the natural right of property in oneself 
is (assuming that it has already been established that individuals have 
this natural right)? And how does one determine exactly how a particular 
limitation on what a person can do to or with himself affects what a per­
son can do to or with objects that he owns (assuming that it has been 
established that individuals have a natural right to acquire property in 
objects)? I will not attempt to answer these questions.
Premise (2) also asserts that individuals have a particular natural 
right (of property). The natural right of property in one's labour, 
however, presents few of the problems and questions associated with the 
natural right of property in oneself. This is the case, at least, when 
premise (1) has been accepted. The natural right of property in one's 
labour can be seen as an aspect of the natural right of property in one­
self. The right to complete and exclusive control of one's labour is in­
corporated in the right to control oneself. One's labour is just an 
aspect of oneself. Premise (2) therefore follows from premise (1).
Premise (3) is not particularly problematic either. A person who 
labours on something and changes it has, in some sence, mixed his labour 
with something and created something new. A person who has built a
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sand castle has done so by joining his labour to the sand. The sand 
castle is the product of the joining of two things, viz. sand and la­
bour. I will ignore the question of whether a person must change what 
he is labouring on in order to have mixed his labour with it. (Does, 
for example, a person mix his labour with a heavy object that he is 
trying unsuccessfully to move?). The point of premise (3) is that cre­
ating something new (i.e. changing something from its natural state) by 
labouring on it constitutes mixing it with or joining it to that labour.
Premise (4) is, of course, the crucial premise. The claim being 
made in (4) is that mixing one's labour with something (unheld) creates 
a property right in that thing. More precisely, mixing one's labour with 
an object that is in its natural state creates a property right in the new 
object which is the product of the labour. A person who works land that 
has never been worked creates productive land by mixing his labour with 
unproductive natural land. In so doing, he has acquired property right 
in the newly created productive land. He has also acquired a property 
right in products of (his labour and) this productive land. But why 
should this be so? Even Nozick is perplexed by this. "Why does mixing 
one's labour with something make one the owner of it?" (ASU p.174). 
According to thé argument, mixing one's labour with something in its 
natural state is mixing what one owns (i.e. one's labour) with what is un­
owned. "But why isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of 
losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't?" (ASU pp. 
174-175).
It is often at this point that Locke's other arguments are mentioned. 
(A person's labour creates 99/100 of the value of what is laboured on, so 
a person deserves or is entitled to - i.e. should have - property in what 
he labours on.) As we have already shown, however, these arguments can­
not establish a natural right of property and are, therefore, only
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ancillary arguments that are of little relevance to this thesis. If 
argument (1) is to be saved, Nozick's questions will have to be answered 
directly. Some argument must be constructed to show that mixing one's 
labour with something does result in a property right.
One possibility is to draw a distinction between what is laboured 
on and what is created by that labouring. The question of how a person 
can come to own something that is unowned does not arise. Individuals do 
not acquire property in what is held in common. They acquire property in 
what they create (out of what is held in common). Is this distinction 
between the object laboured on and the object created by that labour con­
trived or ad hoc? Is there a distinction here to be made or is this 
merely playing with words? Consider a log cabin. Is a log cabin simply 
a collection of tree trunks? Or is a log cabin a different item created 
out of tree trunks? Let us suppose that individuals in the state of na­
ture have a method of altering the molecular structure of an object.
They can rearrange the atoms within a substance and they can even re­
arrange the sub-atomic particles to form different atoms. With this 
ability, individuals could labour on a tree and create out of it a bushel 
of wheat. Does not this process bring into the world a new item that is 
created out of the bits and pieces (i.e. atoms) of a tree? Analogously, 
does not the process of changing a number of trees into a log cabin bring 
into the world a new item created out of bits and pieces (i.e. trees) of 
a forest?
But how does this argument proceed? How do we reach the conclusion 
that people own what they create and bring into the world? Perhaps the 
question should be put differently. What is the status (with respect to 
ownership) of an object that is created and therefore brought into the 
world by human labour? If an argument is needed to show that the indi­
vidual who created it owns it, is not an argument also necessary to show
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that it is unowned? In other words, the question does not concern the 
justification for changing the status of an object from unowned to owned. 
Rather, it concerns the determination of the status of an object that has 
no history of being owned or unowned because it has not history.
Unfortunately, (for this argument) the burden of proof is still on 
the individual claiming the property right. The question is not simply 
is this object owned or unowned. The question is does the individual who 
created this object have a right to complete and exclusive (or any degree 
of) control of it? Why does (and not should) the fact that an individual 
created an object mean that he owns it? Perhaps it is because the object 
'owes' its existence to something he owns. An object that is created by 
human labour would not have existed were it not for that labour. But this 
is no closer to establishing a (natural) right of property in the products 
of one's labour than is the argument we started with. And there is ano­
ther problem which this argument elucidates.
The clearest example of something that is created by human labour 
and'brought into the world' as a new item is another human being. Chil­
dren are the products of (the mixing of) their parents' labour. Are chil­
dren the property of their parents? Do parents have complete and exclu­
sive (and permanent) control of their children? As Becker points out, 
this conclusion is inconsistent with the principle that (all) individuals 
have a natrual right of property in thenselves. (Property Rights,p.37). 
Since both arguments are based on this principle, such a contradiction 
is disastrous unless it can be reconciled. But how is this to be done? 
There are three alternatives. Either children are not the products of 
their parents' labour, or not all individuals have property in themselves, 
or individuals do not have property in all the products of their labour.
The first alternative is attempted by Locke, who recognises this 
problem and discusses it in the First Treatise of Government. Locke
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offers several arguments in Chapter VI, "Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty 
by Fatherhood", to show that parents do not make, or create, their chil­
dren. "How can he be thought to give Life to another, that knows not 
wherein his own Life consists?" (Bk.I,Sect.52). "If he made it, let him, 
when it is out of order, mend it, at least tell wherein the defects lie." 
(Bk.I,Sect.53). The point Locke is making is that man cannot be said to 
create life because he does not know or understand what life is nor how 
it is created. As Nozick says, however, this would apply to many of the 
products of our labour. (ASU p.288). Does the farmer understand how his 
crops are created from seeds? Does the dairy farmer understand how his 
cows were created? Clearly, this argument covers too wide a range of 
cases.
Another argument used by Locke is that God, and not man, is the true 
creator of life, the true parent of children. "Even the Power which God 
himself exerciseth over Mankind is by Right of Fatherhood, yet this Father­
hood is such an one as utterly excludes aill pretence of Title in Earthly 
Parents; for he is King because he is indeed Maker of us all, which no 
Parents can pretend to be of their Children." (Bk.I,Sect.53). Again, 
Nozick responds by pointing out that the position espoused by Locke in 
this passage would severely limit, if not exclude entirely, individuals 
having property in other things (ASU pp.288-289). If the fact that God 
is the creator of life means that children cannot be owned, then it also 
means that all other life, and possibly all other things, cannot be owned 
either. If God's right of Fatherhood over all individuals precludes their 
owning their children, then it precludes them from owning anything at all.
Any argument which attempts to establish that individuals do not 
create their children will run the risk of precluding property in a wide 
range of things, if not in everything. The second alternative, that not 
all individuals have property in themselves, we can dismiss quite quickly.
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This would not only cause serious and probably insurmountable problems 
for any argument that tried to deduce a natural right of property from 
the natural right of property in oneself, it would also be in conflict 
with the Kantian principle of the inviolability of the individual. More 
generally, such a position would be inconsistent with the principle, 
fundamental to Nozick's theory, that no individual is another's master. 
(Young children may not be entirely their own masters, but, on Nozick's 
view, neither are their parents their masters.)
The third alternative is to accept that children are the products 
of their parents' labour but to show that individuals do not always have 
property in the products of their labour. There are two possible ways of 
doing this. Either there is something in the nature of children (perhaps 
that they are also individuals with natural rights) that precludes parents 
owning their children, or there is something in the principle of acquisi­
tion of property that precludes parents owning their children. The first 
possibility is the more attractive of the two. Neither possibility will 
work, however, because both would amount to showing that natural rights 
to the products of one'slabour would be overridden by a child's right to 
be his own master. This would be unacceptable to Nozick.
In his discussion of the Lockean proviso, Nozick has a similar pro­
blem to solve and does so while explicitly rejecting that there is any 
overriding of rights. He claims that when a person finds himself in 
possession of the entirety of a resource that is necessary for the lives 
of others (e.g. water), he does not have the same rights he would have 
were it not necessary for life or were he not in possession of all of it. 
He claims that "there is no such external (and ad hoc?) overriding. Con­
siderations internal to the theory of property itself, to its theory of 
acquisition and appropriation, provide the means for handling such cases." 
(ASU pp.180-181). But this just says that the rights are overridden by
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considerations Internal and not external to the theory of property. If 
Nozick is to accept that rights can be overridden so long as the considera­
tions are contained within the same set of principles that establish the 
rights, then the floodgates are open. All those 'rights to' which Nozick 
claimed no one had (ASU p.238), can be asserted as placing limitations on 
an individual's natural right of property. If a child's right of property 
in himself limits other individuals' rights of property in the products of 
their labour, then why cannot an individual's right to assistance, which 
is internal to the principles that establish natural rights, limit other 
individuals' right of property? I do not see how Nozick can extricate 
himself from this problem. Moreover, I do not see how argument (1) or 
the version of it that I constructed, can answer the problem of property 
in one's children without contradicting some fundamental aspect of Nozick's 
theory. Even if this problem could be solved, there is no apparent way 
of grinding a natural right of property (acquisition) out of argument (1). 
The perplexing questions raised by this argument are asked even by No­
zick'. He did not attempt to answer them and I suggest that this is be­
cause they are unanswerable.
All this is not to say that arguments from human labour cannot esta­
blish some system of private property rights. The arguments offered by 
Locke which concentrate on what people who create things by labouring 
deserve are quite promising. But such arguments cannot establish a natu­
ral right of property and are, therefore, of no relevance to Nozick's 
theory. What Nozick requires from an argument based on human labour is 
a derivation of the natural right of property (acquisition) from the natu­
ral right of property in one's labour. As I have attempted to show, this 
approach to establishing a natural right of property is plagued with pro­
blems. None of the arguments offered by Locke are successful and I see 




In the last chapter, several arguments which attempted to derive the 
natural rights of property from human labour were, examined. These argu­
ments were found not to have established any such natural right and no 
way was found to make this approach successful. It remains, therefore, 
to examine another approach to this problem. As was demonstrated in 
chapter three, most approaches will not work. What must be established 
is a natural right of property and not just a system of private property 
rights. This point is important because many of the arguments for pro­
perty rights that are commonly given, argue for the latter and not the 
former. This is true of many of the arguments offered by Locke and it is 
true of arguments from liberty and from utility.
The arguments that will be the subject of this chapter stem from the 
Kantian principle of the inviolability of the individual. As was mentioned 
in chapter one, Nozick has interpreted the Kantian imperative in a parti­
cular way. Kant would certainly have rejected many of the conclusions wh­
ich Nozick deduces from the principle that individuals are ends and must 
be treated as such and not merely as means. For Kant, this principle en­
tailed both that "to preserve one's life is a duty" and that "to help 
others where one can is a duty." (Groundwork p.63). The categorical im­
perative could not, in Kant's view, result in a natural right of property 
because it entailed an obligation to aid others in their pursuit of their 
ends. This obligation is inconsistent with that concept of property which 
is the basis of Nozick's theory.
Kant and Nozick differ not only in their interpretation of the cate­
gorical imperative, they also differ in their conceptions of ends. For 
Nozick,. an individual's ends are whatever he works for, or desires, or 
seeks to produce. These are relative or subjective ends. For Kant, 
the ends which must be considered when treating another individual (or
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oneself, on Kant's view) are rational objective ends. To treat a per­
son as an end, therefore, may require that his wishes and desires (i.e. 
ends, on Nozick's view) be ignored, if they are contrary to rational ob­
jective ends. For Nozick, no such conclusion follows because he considers 
a person's wishes and desires, (i.e. his subjective ends) to be what must 
be respected. Both these differences are extremely important, but for 
the purpose of this thesis, I will simply accept Nozick's position. In 
this chapter I will tolerate a vague and flexible conception of ends.
In constructing arguments, I will not be concerned to determine whether 
a particular conception of individuals' ends affects our intuition about 
the principle that individuals should always be treated as ends and never 
merely as means.
One argument for a natural right of property that is based on the 
principle of the inviolability of the individual proceeds as follows.
The prohibition on using an individual merely as a means to an end not 
his own entails that every individual has a natural right to determine 
and pursue his own ends.:This natural right entails that any interference 
with a person's pursuit of his own ends (which is within the side constr­
aints) is a violation of his natural rights. Since labouring is an in­
tentional activity, a person who labours does so in pursuit of some goal 
or end. Interfering with a person's labouring, therefore, is a violation 
of his natural rights. Taking or using something that another individual 
is labouring on is an interference with his labouring. Taking or using 
something that another individual is labouring on (within the side con­
straints) is, therefore, a violation of his natural rights. But this is 
just to say that individuals have a natural right of property in whatever 
they labour on.
This.argument has six premises, several of which have already been 
considered. The first premise asserts that the principle of the inviola­
bility of the individual constitutes (or'entails', or 'is another way of
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stating*) the natural right to determine for oneself what goals to pur­
sue or what ends to attempt to achieve and the natural right to perform 
those actions involved in the pursuit of those goals or ends. The justi­
fication for this assertion lies in the comparison of the actions which 
the Kantian imperative prohibits with the actions which the claimed natu­
ral rights prohibit. If individuals must be treated as ends and never 
merely as means, then any action that involves an individual and ignores 
or fails to recognise or contravenes his chosen ends is prohibited 
(assuming that those ends do not violate the side constraints). Similarly, 
if individuals have a natural right to determine and pursue their own 
ends, then any action that involves an individual and ignores or fails to . 
recognise or contravenes his chosen ends is prohibited. To assert the 
Kantian imperative is to claim that certain actions are prohibited. To 
claim that these actions are prohibited is just to assert that individuals 
have the natural right to determine and pursue their own ends.
The second premise is a statement of the consequences of the natural 
right asserted in the first premise. Clearly, if an individual has a 
natural right to pursue his own ends, then any interference with an in­
dividual's pursuit of his own ends (as long as his pursuit is within the 
side constraints) is a violation of his natural rights. The only proble­
matic aspect of this premise is the question of what is to count as an 
interference with an individual's pursuit of his own ends. Is it the 
case that only the performance of an action can constitute an interference 
or can the refusal to perform a particular action also constitute an in­
terference? If a person requires another's assistance in the pursuit of 
some goal, is the other person interfering with the pursuit of that goal 
if he refuses to co-operate? Nozick must maintain that the refusal to 
co-operate with or assist someone in the pursuit of his goals is not an 
interference with that pursuit. If it were an interference, then the in­
dividual would not be inviolable in the sense that Nozick requires.
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Individuals could be obligated to perform actions as a result of-the needs 
and positions of others. Clearly, Nozick cannot accept that.
The third premise was discussed in connection with Locke's arguments. 
Locke drew a distinction between labouring on something and accidentally 
improving it. The more general point can be made, however. Labouring is 
something a person does intentionally and for a purpose. The purpose 
may be to create something, or to destroy something, or simply to change 
something. A person who constructs a sand castle has laboured on the sand, 
A person who absent-mindedly plays with the sand is not labouring even if 
his actions result in a sand castle. In order to be labouring, a person's 
actions must be directed towards some end or goal. This premise is 
straightforward and unproblematic.
The fourth premise of this argument asserts that interfering with a 
person's labouring violates his natural rights. This assertion is a de­
duction from the previous two premises. If labouring is the pursuit of 
one's goals (third premise), and if interfering with the pursuit of an 
individual's goals is a violation of his natural rights (second premise), 
then interfering with an individual's labouring is a violation of his 
natural rights. This premise is also entailed by the natural right of 
property in oneself. This natural right entails the natural right of 
property in one's labour which entails that-an individual has complete 
and exclusive control of his labour. So any interference with his la­
bouring is a violation of his natural rights. That the natural right of 
property in oneself entails an assertion which is also entailed by the 
principle of the inviolability of the individual should not be surprising. 
As was noted in the third chapter, the principle of the inviolability of 
the individual on Nozick's view incorporates the major part of the natu­
ral right of property in oneself.
The fifth premise asserts that it is an interference with an indivi­
dual's labouring to take, or use, or in any way appropriate what he is
labouring on. This premise is common sense and is clearly correct. If 
one individual is building a sand castle (and therefore labouring on the 
sand), and another individual shovels all of the -sand into his pails 
(let us assume this is taking place in a sandbox and not on a beach) , 
then he has interfered with the labouring of the individual building the 
sand castle. That individual has had his labouring interrupted. He can­
not simply continue building his sand castle because all of the sand has 
been shovelled into someone else's pails. Is there ever a situation in 
which taking or appropriating something that someone else is labouring on 
does not constitute an interference with his labouring? The activity of 
labouring is always labouring on something. If a person is labouring on 
something intangible (e.g. an idea), then the question does not arise. 
Otherwise, if someone takes or appropriates what that person is labouring 
on, then his labouring must cease. If an action causes someone to stop 
labouring or to change what he is labouring on, then that action is an 
interference with that labouring.
The sixth and final^ premise of this argument follows from the previous 
two premises. If interfering with an individual's labouring is a violation 
of his natural rights (fourth premise), and if taking or using something 
that someone else is labouring on is an interference with his labouring 
(fifth premise), then taking or using something someone else is labouring 
on is a violation of his natural rights. All six premises, therefore, are 
true and the inferences from one to the other are all valid. The only part 
of this argument that has not been examined is the inference from the last 
premise to the conclusion. Is it valid to infer from the premise that it 
is a violation of an individual's natural rights to take or use something 
he is 1pouring on, to the conclusion that individuals have a natural right 
of property in whatever they labour on?
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Clearly, this is not a valid inference. The only actions that are 
prohibited by the natural right asserted in the sixth premise are those 
which involve taking or using something that someone else is labouring on. 
It does not follow from this that it is prohibited to take or use some­
thing which someone else has laboured on but is no longer laboiaring on.
Yet this is what the conclusion asserts. To have property in an object 
is not just to have it in your possession. If it is your property, it 
remains so even when it is not in your possession. The sixth premise 
claims only that one person may not use ^ a t  another is labouring on 
while he is labouring on it. It does not, however, make any claims about 
what may be done with things that are no longer being laboured on. It is 
not an interference with an individual's labouring to take something he 
was labouring on but no longer is. If an individual has property (as a 
natural right) in something he is labouring on, however, then no other 
individual can take or use it (without his consent) even after he has 
stopped labouring on it.
If this argument is to establish a natural right of property, then 
a premise will have to be added in order to make the argument valid. The 
additional premise must concern the products of one's labour and not the 
activity of labouring. This is because the products of one's labour are 
what exist after the labouring has ceased. "One possible additional pre­
mise is the following: to use or to take the products of another's labour 
is to interfere with his pursuit of his ends. With this premise the argu­
ment under consideration does establish a natural right of property in 
the products of one's labour. Is this additional premise sound? Is it 
an interference with an individual's pursuit of his own ends to take or 
use the products of his labour?
There are two different possible explanations of why this additional 
premise is correct. On the first explanation, it is correct because taking
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the products of another's labour blocks the pursuit of any of his ends 
that involve the use of those products. A person can no longer use a 
house he has built if- someone else begins to dismantle it. On the second 
explanation, the additional premise is correct because the products of an 
individual's labour are manifestly involved in his pursuit of his ends.
The two explanations differ in one important respect. The first explana­
tion is not based on anything peculiar to the products of an individual's 
labour. The pursuit of one's ends may involve the products of one's 
labour but it may also involve things which are not the product of one's 
labour. As a result of this, the first explanation would result in every­
one having property in whatever they needed to pursue their ends. But this 
is contrary to Nozick's conception of property. On his view, many people 
having rights of control over the same thing is inconsistent with any one 
of them having property in that thing. How can it be the case that anyone 
who requires a particular item for the pursuit of his ends has complete and 
exclusive control of that item?
The second explanation avoids this problem by concentrating on the 
products of an individual's labour. The basis of this explanation is 
that the products of an individual's labour stand in a unique relation­
ship to his pursuit of his ends. The pursuit of one's ends is here con­
strued as a process which involves the products of one's labour. Many 
things may be required in the pursuit of one's ends but only the products 
of one's labour are actually a part of that process. To take something 
that another needs is to block his use of a potential element of his pur­
suit of his ends. To take the products of an individual's labour, how­
ever, is to block his use of an actual element of his pursuit of his ends 
and, therefore, to block that pursuit. The products of an individual's 
labour are just those things which he has incorporated into his pursuit 
of his ends.
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On this second explanation, the additional premise in conjunction with 
the other six premises does lead to the conclusion that it is a violation 
of an individual's natural rights to take or use'the products of his la­
bour. The only difficulty is that the additional premise on the second 
explanation is, strictly speaking, unsoijnd. Not every product of an in­
dividual's labour is an element of his pursuit of his ends. Even if most 
are, some of the products of his labour will be of no use to him in the 
pursuit of his ends. A person may build something to use for a particu­
lar purpose and find that it does not work. Just the possibility that an 
individual may not need some of the products of his labour is sufficient 
to require an alteration of the additional premise. That premise should 
be: to use, or take those products of another's labour that are involved 
in his pursuit of his ends is to interfere with his pursuit of his ends.
This revised premise is sound but with this revision, the argument 
does not establish a natural right of property. If an individual may ex­
clude others from using the products of his labour only when those pro­
ducts are of use to him, then he does not have property in the products 
of his labour. An individual does not have property in something he may 
control just so long as ....  The natural right of property gives an in­
dividual complete and exclusive and permanent control of what is his pro­
perty. The argument just examined, even with the revised additional pre­
mise can only establish a system of limited private property and not a 
natural right of property.
The additional premise, however, does suggest a different argument 
for a natural right of property. This argument is also based on the prin­
ciple of the inviolability of the individual. The argument proceeds as 
follows-. The principle of the inviolability of the individual entails 
that an individual has a natural right not to be used as a means to 
another's end& This natural right prohibits using an individual as a means 
to another's end which entails a prohibition on using an individual's labour
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as a means to another's end. To use the products of an individual's labour
is to use that individual's labour. It is, therefore, prohibited to use
the products of an individual's labour as a means, to another's end. An
individual, therefore, has a natural right of property in the products of 
9
his labour.
This argument has four premises, the first of which we discussed above 
and was shown to be unproblematic. The second has two parts. The first 
part merely states the consequences of the natural right not to be used as 
a means to another's end, viz. such actions are prohibited. The second 
part of this premise asserts that if using an individual as a means to 
another's end is prohibited, then using an individual's labour as a means 
to another's end is also prohibited. Although this part of the second pre­
mise is correct, it is not unproblematic. The prohibition on using a 
person's labour as a means to another's end follows from the prohibition 
on using a person as a means to another's end in just the same way as the 
natural right of property in one's labour follows from the natural right of 
property in oneself. An individual's labour is part of his person. To use 
his labour is just to use him. The difficulty arises in trying to determine 
exactly what is to count as using an individual's labour.
This question is particularly relevant to the/third premise of this 
argument which asserts that using the products of a person's labour is the 
same as using that person's labour. Since the fourth premise follows un- 
problematically from this premise, it is clearly this premise on which the 
argument rests. What does constitute using a person's labour? If one per­
son forces another person to dig ditches, then clearly he is using that per­
son's labour. But this is not surprising, since forcing a person to perform 
an action is a paradigm of slavery and slavery is a paradigm of using a 
person's labour as a means to an end not his own. Not all examples are 
this clear. Is it using a person's labour to build a house
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in a clearing in a forest that was created by another person chopping 
down all the trees? The clearing is in some sense a product of some­
one else's labour. Moreover, the person building a house in that clearing 
is benefitting from the labour of someone else. The notion of 'benefit', 
however, does not have any role in this argument. The argument is not, 
nor can it be, based on the premise that individuals should not benefit 
from the labour of others. What must be shown is that individuals are pro­
hibited from using or taking the products of the labour of others.
Yet, what is wrong with using something someone else has created, if 
the creator no longer wants or needs it? (Even this would be prohibited 
unless the creator gave his consent). Is this tantamount to using the 
labour of the person who created it? Clearly, there is a crucial differ­
ence between forcing a person to labour and simply using something someone 
else has freely created. To use something is to direct it; it is to con­
trol it. To use the products of another's labour is to control them; to 
decide what will happen to them. In no way, however, does this entail 
that the labour of the individual whose products they are, is being con­
trolled or directed. His labour was "used" only in the trivial sense 
that it was used to create what another is now using. In order to show 
that a person who uses the products of another individual's labour, is 
using that individual's labour, it must be shown that controlling the pro­
ducts of another individual's labour is controlling that individual's la­
bour. Clearly, this cannot be demonstrated. If a person freely creates 
something and another person uses it, the creator is not thereby made a 
slave. Only if an individual's labour is actually being controlled or 
directed is that individual's labour being used. Using the products of 
another,' s labour is not the same as using that individual. An example 
which makes this point clearly is that of the products of the labour of 
a person who is dead. To use those products is certainly not to use the
labour of a dead man.
The arguments for a natural right of property that have been consi­
dered in this chapter are based on the Kantian principle of the inviola­
bility of the individual. Although it may be possible to deduce from 
this principle some system of private property rights, none of the argu­
ments considered, successfully established a natural right of property. 
The major problem with this approach to establishing such a natural right 
is that it focuses on an individual's pursuit of his ends. Only insofar 
as the products of an individual's labour are necessary for his pursuit 
of his ends does any property right follow. Yet many of the products of 
individuals' labour are irrelevant to the pursuit of their ends. It is 





In the previous two chapters, two approaches to the problem of 
establishing a natural right of property were considered. Locke's argu­
ments from human labour were examined in chapter three and arguments 
stemming from the principle of the inviolability of the individual were 
evaluated in chapter four. The conclusionsof both these chapters are 
that none of the arguments considered, successfully establishes a natural 
right of property. Moreover, the problems which plague these arguments 
are insurmountable.
The Lockean arguments in support of a natural right of property, 
attempt to derive that natural right from another natural right, viz. the 
natural right of property in oneself. If this approach is to provide a 
successful argument, some justification must be given for accepting a 
premise that bridges the gap between having property in oneself and having 
property in the products of one's labour. I can see no way of justifying 
any such premise and I can see no way of bridging this gap so as to esta­
blish a natural right of property in the products of one's labour.
The arguments which attempt to derive a natural right of property 
from the Kantian principle of the inviolability of the individual are 
similarly unsuccessful. This approach produces arguments which are based 
on one of two related principles. Either they are based on the principle 
that using the products of another's labour is an interference with that 
individual's pursuit of his own ends, or they are based on the principle 
that using the products of another's labour is tantamount to (i.e. is the 
same as) treating that individual not as an end but as a means to an end 
not his own. The first principle fails to establish a natural right of 
property because no case can be made for the assertion that all the pro­
ducts of one's labour are necessary for, or are a part of, one's pursuit 
of one's ends. Without this assertion, however, arguments which are based
67.
on this principle cannot establish a right of property in the products 
of one's labour.
Arguments based on the second principle also_ fail to establish a 
natural right of property. These arguments fail because the major assump­
tion of the second principle, viz. that using the products of another's 
labour is the same as using that individual's labour, is simply not true.
As a result, the principle itself is false and any arguments based on it 
will fail to establish a natural right of property. Therefore, the main 
conclusion of the previous two chapters is that neither of the two appro­
aches examined in detail in this thesis can produce a successful argument 
for a natural right of property. This conclusion, by itself, might not 
be so damaging to Nozick's theory, since another approach to the problem 
of establishing a natural right of property could prove successful.
Another major conclusion which was reached in chapter three, however, 
is that the other approaches to this problem are irrelevant to the defence 
of Nozick's theory. This conclusion was based on an analysis of two al­
ternative approaches. Both the approach based on utility and the approach 
based on liberty were shown to provide, at most, justifications for some 
system of private property rights. This is because both approaches seek 
to justify property rights as a means to an end. But natural rights can­
not be justified as a means to an end. Therefore, neither approach can 
provide an argument which establishes a natural right of property.
Not only are arguments from utility and arguments from liberty of no 
use to Nozick, any approach which attempts to justify property rights as 
a means to an end are also of no use to Nozick. Of the approaches to this 
problem that have been suggested, only the two examined in this thesis do 
not attempt to justify property rights as a means to an end. Only these 
two approaches, therefore, have any chance of establishing a natural right 
of property. The conclusion that neither of these approaches is successful
in establishing a natural right of property, therefore, is also the 
conclusion that a natural right of property cannot be established. There 
is no justification for Nozick's claim that individuals have a natural 
right of property.
How does this conclusion affect Nozick's theory? Is it as devastating 
as I have suggested? After all, I have admitted that it is quite possible 
that some system of private property rights can be justified. Are such 
justifications irrelevant to the defence of Nozick's theory, as I have 
claimed? Or it is possible to revise Nozick's conclusions so as to make 
them follow from a consequentially justified system of private property 
rights?
Unless Nozick can establish a natural right of property, he cannot 
defend the main conclusion of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. That conclusion 
is that no state whose functions extend beyond those of the minimal state 
can be justified. This conclusion rests on three assertions which Nozick 
makes. (1) Individuals are inviolable, and therefore no individual or 
group is permitted (morally) to use or control another individual (without 
that individual's consent). (2) Individuals have a natural right of property 
and therefore no individual or group is permitted (morally) to use or 
control anything which is the property of another individual (without that 
individual's consent). (3) Individuals do not have any natural rights which 
require or obligate other individuals to perform specific actions, and there­
fore, the moral side constraints only prohibit, and never require, the per­
formance of specific actions. These three assertions, taken together, pre­
clude any state from legitimately (i.e. morally) extending its functions 
beyond those of the minimal state.
(I indicated in the third chapter that Nozick has a severe problem with 
the third assertion. It is necessary to his theory, yet within his 
theory is an example of natural rights which do require others to perform
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specific actions. The Lockean proviso establishes these rights.
Nozick admits that considerations internal to the theory of property can 
limit a person's right to a vital resource if he becomes the owner of 
the entirety of that resource. This is just to claim that individuals 
have a natural right to receive vital resources. Although I think this 
is a great problem for Nozick, it is not the major concern of this thesis.)
Can Nozick's theory be revised to accommodate the following revision 
of assertion (2)? Individuals have a consequentially justified right of 
private property. Clearly it cannot be. For if the right of property is 
consequentially justified, it no longer follows that no individual or 
group is permitted (morally) to use or control anything which is the pro­
perty of another individual (without that individual's consent). This 
prohibition on using or controlling another's property would only follow 
to the extent to which the consequences that justified the property rights 
did not also justify using or controlling another's property. In other 
words, some property right could be justified as a means to an end, and 
that could be consistent with the justification of state intervention in 
the economic activity of its citizens as a means to that same end.
Nozick's claim that only the minimal state is justified, must be 
supported by an absolute right of property. Only an absolute right of 
property can entail an absolute prohibition*on using or controlling ano­
ther's property. And only a natural right of property is an absolute 
right of property. Natural rights are absolute because they cannot be 
established or altered by the actions of individuals or groups. Moreover, 
natural rights require no justification and so there cannot be any argu­
ment or dispute about whether individuals should have a particular natural 
right. Natural rights simply are those rights which individuals have, 
because individuals have them by virtue of their being rational individuals. 
Only the claim that individuals have a given natural right requires justi­
fication. A justification for such a claim is provided by an argument
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which establishes that individuals have the natural right in question.
No argument has been found which establishes a natural right of pro­
perty. Therefore, Nozick's claim that individuals have this natural right 
is unjustified. Without this claim, however, Nozick cannot establish that 
a more than minimal state must violate the natural rights of individuals. 
Nozick has failed to demonstrate, therefore, the main position which he 
puts forth in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. He has failed to establish that 
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